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HARD CASES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A
PROPOSED TAXONOMY OF INTERPRETATIVE
CHALLENGES
H. ALLEN BLAIR*
Words gain their fluctuating meanings from the fluctuating contexts in
which people put them.1
INTRODUCTION
All judges, Frank Easterbrook observes, follow at least one simple
rule of interpretation: “when the statute is clear, apply it.”2 Although Judge
Easterbrook makes this observation about the domestic interpretation of
statutes, it is a fair bet that he would concede its general applicability to the
interpretation of legal documents around the world. Certainly, with respect
to the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the

* I would like to thank Kent Greenawalt, Robert E. Scott, Clayton Gillette, and Alejandro M.
Garro for their advice, comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to
thank the Central States Law School Association for providing financial support for the presentation of
a working draft of the article at the 2009 annual conference.
1. Richard Rorty, The Spirit of France’s Great Revolutionary Lives On, TIMES HIGHER ED.
SUPPL., Nov. 12, 2004, available at http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode
=192401&sectioncode=26.
2. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HAR. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994). Judge Easterbrook adopts, then, at least a soft formalist distinction between
what HLA Hart described as a “core of certainty” and a “penumbra of doubt” or a “fringe of
vagueness.” See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119–20, 123–26, 128 (1961). As the spatial
metaphor suggests, the determinacy of a given legal norm is a matter of degree. Nevertheless, Judge
Easterbrook, like Hart, seems to believe that, at least as a general matter, particular cases can be located
in one metaphorical space or the other. See id. at 123, 132. For purposes of this Article, I too assume
that some significant number of cases can be said, at least for many practical purposes, to fall into a
“core of certainty” and thus can be said to be “easy cases” of interpretation.
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International Sale of Goods (“CISG”),3 Judge Easterbrook’s rule seems to
hold true.4
Beyond this simple rule, however, little consensus exists about the
interpretation of the CISG in hard cases—cases where a CISG provision is
vague either on its face or in its application.5 Because the CISG contains
numerous vague provisions6 and applies to a transactionally-diverse range
of deals,7 hard cases are not unusual. In fact, “[e]xamples of divergences in

3. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1984), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG or the Convention] available at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html.
4. See, e.g., United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, ¶ 1, May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1980/01/19800127%200052%20AM/Ch_XXIII_01p.pdf (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.”).
The CISG is interpreted and applied not only by the domestic courts of each member state but also by
arbitral panels. For the sake of simplicity, and following the lead of Professor John Honnold, a “giant in
the field” of CISG scholarship, see Harry Fletchner, Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The Homeward Trend and Exemption for
Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L. REV. 29, 30 & n.5 (2007) (“Professor Honnold
served as secretary of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
during the time in which the CISG was developed and led the U.S delegation to the 1980 Vienna
diplomatic conference at which the final text of the Convention was approved.”), I will generally use
the term “tribunal” when referring to the courts and arbitral panels interpreting and applying the CISG.
See JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES, 1
(1989) (“The Convention, faute de mieux, will often be applied by tribunals (judges or arbitrators) . . .
.”).
5. I borrow the term “hard cases” from Ronald Dworkin. According to Ronald Dworkin, “hard
cases” exist primarily for two reasons: “[s]tatutes and common law rules are often vague and must be
interpreted before they can be applied to novel cases. Some cases, moreover, raise issues so novel that
they cannot be decided even by stretching or reinterpreting existing rules.” Ronald Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1975).
6. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales
Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 474 (2005) (“[V]ague standards pervade the CISG.”); Juana
Coetzee, Securing the Future of Electronic Sales in the Context of International Sales, 11 VINDOBONA
J. INT’L COM. L & ARB. 11, 24 (2007) (“The CISG was drafted in terms that are often considered to be
vague and that have to be interpreted.”); Larry A. DiMatteo, et. al., The Interpretive Turn in
International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 299, 320 (2004) (“Many of the CISG articles provide very general, vague default rules tied to the
concept of reasonableness.”); Craig M. Gertz, The Selection of Choice of Law Provisions in
International Commercial Arbitration: A Case for Contractual Depecage, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
163, 174 (1991) (“There are . . . numerous examples of provisions in the CISG that offer mere vague
and uncertain standards.”).
7. See, e.g., Adam M. Giuliano, Nonconformity in the Sale of Goods Between the United Staets
and China: The New Chinese Contract Law, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 331, 334 (2006) (“The CISG
addresses the international sale of moveable goods and encompasses a wide range of transactions and
related matters . . . .”) (citations omitted); Steven Walt, The State of Debate over the Incorporation
Strategy in Contract Law, 38 UCC L.J. 255, 264 (2006) (noting that the CISG applies to “a wide range
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the [interpretation and thus] application of nearly all the provisions of the
CISG abound.”8
Many commentators believe that the lack of interpretive consensus
among the various tribunals applying the Convention threatens to
undermine its express goal of establishing uniform rules to govern
international commercial contracts and thus remove “legal barriers in . . .
and promote the development of international trade.”9 Commentators
supportive of the CISG seek to combat this threat by urging the
development of “an international community” of tribunals that interpret the
Convention’s provisions by looking to one another’s decisions and without
regard to domestic laws or norms.10 Other commentators, who are more

of different types of contracts for the sale of goods”); Charles Sukurs, Harmonizing the Battle of the
Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1483 (2001) (“The CISG is a
significant treaty because of the breadth of its application to a wide range of international contracts.”).
8. Camilla Baasch Anderson, The Uniform International Sales Law and The Global
Jurisconsultorium, 24 J.L. & COM. 159, 162 (2005).
9. CISG, supra note 3, at pmbl.; see, e.g., Aneta Spaic, Approaching Uniformity in International
Sales Law Through Autonomous Interpretation, 11 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 237, 257
(2007) (“If domestic tribunals introduce divergent textual interpretations, the CISG will be unsuccessful
in its goals and its existence will be threatened.”); John Felemegas, Introduction to AN INTERNATIONAL
APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 1, 7 (John Felemegas ed., 2007) (“The practical
success of the Convention depends on whether its provisions are interpreted and applied similarly by
different national courts and arbitral tribunals.”); Michael Joachim Bonell, The CISG, European
Contract Law & The Development of a World Contract, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2008) (“The
importance of the CISG has been questioned on the grounds . . . that in the absence of an international
tribunal competent to make preliminary rulings on questions concerning its interpretation it . . . risks
being applied differently in different parts of the world.”); Phanesh Koneru, The International
Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach
Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 105, 106 (1997) (stating that Article 7, which
assures uniformity of interpretation, “is arguably the single most important provision in ensuring the
future success of the Convention”); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity
Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 7
(1993) (“Divergent interpretations of the Convention would lead back to the very uncertainties the
Convention’s drafters intended to eliminate and would thereby increase the costs of international
commerce.”).
10. See infra Part II.A; see also, e.g., Andersen, supra note 8, at 162; Lisa M. Ryan, The
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 99, 117 (1995) (“Unification of the law of the international community means subjecting
people from all political, economic, and legal systems of the world to a uniform set of rules and
principles . . . [and efforts at unification] are undermined by the divergent interpretations of the text by
countries of different legal traditions.”); Spaic, supra note 9, at 238 (advocating for the “establishment
of an ‘international legal practice’ consisting of the development of a strong and uniform international
case law” in order to achieve uniformity of interpretive outcomes); Amy H. Kastely, The Right to
Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an International Interpretation of the Vienna
Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 651 (1988) (“Courts and commentators should strive to develop an
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skeptical of the CISG, suggest that non-uniform interpretations have, or
soon will, completely undermine the Convention, rendering it at best an
unwieldy obstacle that contracting parties have to avoid and at worst an
impediment to the future development of a truly useful international sales
law.11
Whatever their stance on the merits of the CISG, however, these
commentators tend to make the same basic assumption: the future of the
CISG necessarily hinges on tribunals reaching uniform interpretative
outcomes with respect to all vague CISG provisions. I contend that this
assumption is flawed.12 It stems from a narrow reading of Article 7 of the
Convention, the article addressing interpretation of the CISG itself.13 This
narrow reading recognizes only a binary distinction between vague
international jurisprudence of Convention interpretation which gives detailed content to the notion of
internationalism in transnational trade law.”).
11. For instance, Clayton Gillette and Robert Scott contend that
In the case of the CISG, the lack of meaningful uniformity is exacerbated by the failure to create
interpretive mechanisms that, over time, might have given substantive content to the vague default
standards. The upshot is a treaty whose provisions are likely to become less and less useful as time goes
on. Indeed, we predict that CISG ultimately will lose out in competition with alternative legal regimes.
Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 485; see also Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and
Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 744 (1999) (“I wish to sound a
skeptical note. Much of the effort directed at unifying [contract laws] is unnecessary, and some
produces rules that hinder rather than promote international business.”); Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG
Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1516 (2006) (“[N]ot only do vague rules not
provide precise answers and thus reduce legal certainty, but if contained in an international instrument,
they are also likely to be interpreted differently by courts and thus jeopardize the actual harmonization
of the field.”); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law on International Sales, 32 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 273, 276 (1999) (“[T]his article contends that the CISG is actually an obstacle to uniformity
in the law of international sales.”).
12. A few other commentators agree and conclude that uniformity of interpretive outcomes is not
required by the CISG. See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, Parol Evidence Under the CISG: The
“Homeward Trend” Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 138 (2007) (“More importantly, the language
and drafting history of the Convention suggest that, notwithstanding Article 7(1), uniformity was not
the exclusive goal of the CISG project.”). Professor Cross, for instance, argues that Article 7(1)
requires, at least in part, that “the interpreter . . . be sensitive to the compromises that made adoption of
the Convention possible.” Id. at 140; see also, e.g., Peter M. Gerhart, The Sales Convention in Courts:
Uniformity, Adaptability and Adoptability, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS REVISITED 77, 80
(P. Šarčević & P. Volken eds., 2001) (arguing that the CISG’s goal of achieving uniform interpretive
outcomes must be balanced against the need to ensure the acceptability of the Convention in the long
term). Similarly, Larry A. DiMatteo has recognized that “[t]he fact that Article 7 prefaces its uniformity
mandate with ‘regard is to be had’ implies that a standard below strict uniformity in application was
envisioned.” LARRY A DIMATTEO, LUCIEN J. DHOOGES, STEPHANIE GREENE, VIRGINIA MAURER &
MARISA ANNE PAGNATTANO, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG
JURISPRUDENCE 11 (2005). While I share these commentator’s concerns, my argument differs
somewhat from theirs in that my focus is not on the acceptability of the Convention to the member
states, as such, but to the transacting parties whose deals are or may be governed by the Convention.
13. See CISG, supra note 3, at art. 7.
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provisions involving gaps in coverage of the CISG—so called “internal
gaps”—and vague provisions involving matters outside of the coverage of
the CISG—so called “external gaps.”14 All internal gaps must, according to
this view, be plugged in a uniform manner in order to preserve the stability
and usefulness of the Convention. Only external gaps, in contrast, can be
dealt with through recourse to domestic laws and thus handled in nonuniform ways. This conventional construction of Article 7 ignores a critical
distinction in internal gap cases between CISG provisions that are
intentionally vague—”open-textured standards”—and provisions that are
vague because of drafting imperfections—what I will refer to as “unclear
rules.”15
I contend that we need a more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG cases.
This more nuanced taxonomy would recognize that uniformity of
interpretive outcomes is an improper goal in hard CISG cases involving
open-textured standards.16 Such standards may provide value to contracting
parties by allowing them to avoid the costs associated with bargaining ex
ante for more precise rules,17 delegating, instead, to a future tribunal the
task of deciding whether or not the standard was met.18 Contracting parties
that accede to a CISG open-textured standard count on future tribunals to
specify the metric by which compliance with the standard will be measured

14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part III.B.
16. But see infra Part III (noting that striving for uniform interpretive outcomes with respect to
unclear CISG rules remains an important goal).
17. The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for many years.
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between
Rules and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830
(1993) (“[T]he amount of ink spilled over debating the virtues of rules versus standards would lead the
reasonable observer to believe that something momentous was at stake.”). For good contemporary
discussions of the distinction, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 559–68 (1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic efficiency); Russell B.
Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25
(2000) (“Rules establish legal boundaries based on the presence or absence of well-specified triggering
facts.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992)
(“Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value
choices to be worked out elsewhere.”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13–29 (2009)
(discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or
standards). See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 256 (1995) (examining relative efficiency of two-party bargaining under rules and
standards); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding
the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999). My goal is not to add substantively to this debate but instead simply to
observe that both rules and standards can and do have value to contracting parties.
18. See infra Part III.
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on a case-by-case basis, with the advantage of hindsight.19 This method of
specification means that it is quite possible that a CISG open-textured
standard will be interpreted to mean one thing in one case and a different
thing in another. Such non-uniform interpretive outcomes are not only
acceptable; they may be necessary in order to achieve the efficiency goals
of the contracting parties.20
A more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG cases, in short, should
recognize that, even with respect to so-called internal gaps, Article 7
mandates uniformity of interpretive methodology, not necessarily
uniformity of interpretive outcomes.21 Such a taxonomy would then more
accurately reflect the substantive design of the Convention, which aims
primarily at respecting the freedom of contracting parties and reducing the
costs of international contracting.22 As an ancillary benefit, by helping
recalibrate expectations about interpretive uniformity, a more nuanced
taxonomy of hard CISG cases would establish a framework for evaluating
whether any remaining non-uniformity in the interpretation of unclear
CISG rules undermines the CISG as a whole.
This article endeavors to develop such a taxonomy. It proceeds in
three parts.
Part I starts by briefly chronicling the development of the CISG and
outlining its substantive design. Part I contends that the predominate goal
of the CISG is to help commercial parties maximize their gains from trade.
The CISG’s substantive design, which places almost no limits on the
parties’ ability to structure their deal and thus endorses a strong view of
freedom of contract, rests on the assumption that parties are the best judges
of how to achieve this maximization.
Part II turns to an examination of Article 7, which sets out the
Convention’s interpretive scheme.23 Part II begins by analyzing the
prevailing view of Article 7(1), which urges tribunals to adopt the so-called
“autonomous” interpretive perspective, eschewing reliance on domestic
law and striving, instead, to harmonize their decisions with those of other
international tribunals applying the CISG. Part II then argues that most

19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 12, at 19 (“CISG’s interpretive methodology provides a
template for addressing substantive gaps or issue of law not directly (expressly) dealt with by the
CISG.”).
22. See infra Part I.
23. Article 7 lays out interpretive principles applicable to resolve ambiguities in the text of the
CISG. Article 8 also addresses interpretation, but it deals with interpretive principles applicable to
resolve ambiguities in the parties’ express contract. CISG, supra note 3, at arts. 7–8.
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commentators pair Article 7(1)’s autonomous interpretation principle with
a narrow reading of Article 7(2), which articulates a simple binary
classification of interpretive challenges. The result is that most
commentators conclude that tribunals should strive to reach uniform
interpretive outcomes in all internal gap cases by relying on the precedent
of other CISG tribunals.
Part III introduces the proposed new taxonomy of hard CISG cases. It
begins by arguing that the conventional picture of CISG interpretation fails
to recognize the value of open-textured standards. Relying on the
conclusion reached in Part I that the CISG embraces a particularly strong
vision of freedom of contract, Part III contends that contracting parties
acceding to application of the CISG may well want tribunals to interpret
open-textured CISG defaults in the context of the particular deal and
without regard to the interpretations of those same defaults issued by other
tribunals. Maximizing party welfare, in other words, may require that
tribunals engage in ex post, context-dependent interpretation and
specification of open-textured standards. Part III then turns to an
articulation of the proposed new taxonomy of hard CISG interpretive cases.
It observes that there are three—instead of two—broad types of hard CISG
cases, each of which contains two subcategories. With respect to two of
these subcategories, the goal of uniform interpretive outcomes is improper
given the value of default standards to contracting parties.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND DESIGN OF THE CISG
A remarkable achievement, the CISG represents the culmination of
more than half a century of labor.24 While a complete history of the CISG
is well beyond the scope of this Article,25 this Part begins by concisely
recounting the CISG’s development, highlighting some of the key
rationales behind the creation of a uniform international sales law. In so
doing, it will show that the perhaps the most fundamental premise of the
Convention is that parties are the best judges of their welfare. Part I
concludes by observing that the basic structure and contents of the
Convention embrace a particularly robust conception of freedom of

24. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 183, 184–85 (1994); see also Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much
Regard Should We Have?, 8 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 181, 181 (2004) (arguing that the
CISG stands as UNCITRAL’s greatest achievement since it was established in 1966).
25. For more about the negotiating history of the Convention, see generally CESARE M. BIANCA &
MICHAEL J. BONNELL, COMMENTARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTION (1987); HONNOLD, supra note 4; Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 265 (1984).
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contract. This Part lays the foundation for my argument in Part III that a
more nuanced taxonomy of hard cases will align more appropriately with
the general principles of the CISG than the conventional view of
interpretation.
A. Solutions through Compromises: The Genesis of a Uniform
International Law of Sales
During the past two centuries, the world has become a much smaller
place to do business. As the world of global commerce has shrunk, the
desire for a uniform sales law has grown.26 At the very least, hopeful
prognostications about the viability or existence of such a uniform law have
not been in short supply. More than 250 years ago, for instance, Lord
Mansfield declared that “mercantile law . . . is the same all over the world.
For from the same premises, the sound conclusions of reason and justice
must universally be the same.”27 The mercantile law Lord Mansfield
referred to has often been called the lex mercatoria,28 a practical body of
customary law created by the merchants and commercial courts throughout
Europe in the sixteenth century.29 By the nineteenth century, however,
whatever uniformity existed through the lex mercatoria30 had given way to

26. See, e.g., Ronald Harry Graveson, The International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 4,
4 (1968) (“The international process of assimilating the diverse legal systems of various countries goes
back into ancient history.”).
27. Pelly v. Royal Exch. Assurance Co., 97 Eng. Rep. 342, 346 (1757).
28. “Lex Mercatoria” translates to “law merchant,” which is defined as “[a] system of customary
law that developed in Europe during the Middle Ages and regulated the dealings of mariners and
merchants in all the commercial countries of the world until the 17th century.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 966 (8th ed. 2004). For more on the history of the lex mercatoria, see THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 657, 657–70 (5th ed. 1956); Harold J. Berman
& Colin Kaufmann, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex mercatoria), 19 HARV.
L.J. 221, 225 (1978).
29. See Ferrari, supra note 24, at 184–85. Broadly speaking, there were at least five characteristics
of the lex mercatoria:
Its special characteristics were that it was first of all transnational. Secondly, it was based on a common
origin and a faithful reflection of the mercantile customs. Thirdly, it was not administered by
professional judges but by merchants themselves . . . . Fourthly, its procedures were speedy and
informal and finally fifthly, as overriding principles, it emphasized freedom of contract and decision of
cases ex aequo et bono.
Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts Form a New Lex
Mercatoria?, PACE DATABASE ON THE CISG AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW pt. II(1) ¶ 3
(June 1998), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html.
30. There may be historically sound reasons to doubt whether the lex mercatoria, assuming that it
existed at all, was as uniform as Lord Mansfield suggested. See, e.g., Sieg Eislen, Adoption of the
Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L. J.
323, 333 (1996) (“Whether the idea that the lex mercatoria of the Middle Ages formed a uniform sales
code that was universally and consistently applied throughout Europe at the various fairs and markets is
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contract laws promulgated by nations.31 Most countries had developed, or
were developing, their own, often complex, internal laws governing both
domestic and international contracting and sales.32 The result was that
international sellers and buyers were, through application of conflict of law
rules, subjected to an uneven and often unpredictable patchwork of
domestic regulations.33
By the close of the nineteenth century, this patchwork meant that
goods were more expensive than they needed to be. Though international
trade was expanding quickly, the potential for a true global economy was
stymied by the costs associated with complying with these complex and
frequently contradictory regulations.34 A nostalgic yearning for a return to
the uniform, if not always simple, rules of the lex mercatoria inspired
reformers, at the end of the nineteenth century, to begin creating an
international code governing sales.35 The animating idea behind this code
was to “overcome the nationality of [commercial] law.”36

historically well founded is arguable.”); M.J. MUSTILL & S. BOYD, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ENGLAND 81 (2d ed. 1989) (expressing doubt about the existence of a
lex mercatoria).
31. See, e.g., Noel Cox, The Law of Arms in New Zealand, 18 NZ U.L. REV. 225, 255 (1998)
(“The decline of the Staple Courts, where the lex mercatoria or law merchant was administered, was
largely due to Sir Edward Coke, who oversaw the acquisition by the common law Courts of most of the
commercial litigation from the early part of the seventeenth century.”).
32. See CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF, CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF’S SELECT ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 25–26 (Jiarui Zheng ed., 1988).
33. Private international law at this point in history was considered to be complicated, abstract and
had the reputation of being the “nuclear physics of jurisprudence.” Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners – The
Methodology for Interpretation and Application of the UN Convention for the International Sale of
Goods (May 2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Melbourne), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/4corners.html#15 (last updated May 19, 2003).
34. See, e.g., Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1993) (“The
primary motive for the drafters’ toil . . . was their belief that the ‘diversity of municipal laws’ applicable
to contracts for the international sale of goods posed a ‘serious obstacle to the free exchange of
goods.’”) (citations omitted).
35. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts: Three Attempts at
Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 305 (1962) (“In an age of diversity among legal systems, we can
look back with nostalgia to the hegemony of the law merchant, when commercial men could order their
affairs according to an international body of custom which was applied with some consistency.”); see
also MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW-THE
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 3 (1994) (discussing the
justifications for the development of harmonized international commercial law); Ernst Von Caemmerer,
The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Development and Character of the Commercial
Law in the Civil Law Countries, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90 (Clive M.
Schmitthoff ed., 1962) (“[W]henever the private law is splintered into many jurisdictional fragments,
the need for uniformity shows up most strongly in the field of commercial law.”).
36. Ferrari, supra note 24, at 184–85.
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In 1926, Ernst Rabel made a specific, if somewhat limited, proposal to
codify a uniform law of sale.37 An early draft of this project was adopted in
1939 by the council of the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (“UNIDROIT”).38 The Second World War, however, hindered
further developments until 1951, when this draft was tabled at the Hague
Conference on the Unification of Sales Law.39 In 1956, a special
commission appointed by the Conference prepared and presented another
version of this draft, which was then reworked several times until finally,
on April 25, 1964, the conference members adopted two conventions, the
Convention for the Uniform Law of International Sales (“ULIS”) and the
Convention for the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (“ULF”).40 While neither of these early
predecessors to the CISG was widely adopted outside of Europe,41 they
paved the way for drafting the CISG by a working group of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which
saw the participation of delegates from sixty-two countries and observers
from eight international organizations.42 This group’s work started in
earnest by the early 1970s and finished in 1980.43
Ultimately then, it is not an overstatement to say that the CISG
resulted from the dedicated work of many different drafters making
contributions over the course of the twentieth century. In the eyes of some,
the CISG has “surpassed all expectations,” coming to “represent[] the most
successful attempt to unify an important part of the many and various rules
of the law of international commerce.”44 Others point out that it is, in the
37. Sieg Eiselen, Adoption of the Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods (the
CISG) in South Africa, 116 S. AFR. L. J. 323, 334 (1996); see also, e.g., Peter Huber, Comparative Sales
Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 940 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006); Michael Joachim Bonell, Introduction to the Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA CONVENTION 3 (Cesare Massimo Bianca & Michael
Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) (acknowledging Rabel’s involvement in the development of UNIDROIT
and early efforts at the unification of sales law).
38. See Eiselen, supra note 37, at 334.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 5 (4th ed. 2009).
42. See Eiselen, supra note 37, at 336.
43. See id.
44. Peter Schlechtriem, Preface, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) at v (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed.
2005); see also Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES
HANDELSGERICT 227, 227 (2006) (“It is therefore fair to say that the CISG has in fact been one of the
success stories in the field of the international unification of private law.”); E. Allan Farnsworth,
Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 204
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end, a document filled with compromises designed to make it amenable to
the legal systems whose representatives adopted it.45 Despite these
compromises, or perhaps because of them, the Convention has been
adopted by seventy-three states from all five continents,46 including many
of the world’s major trading nations.47 As a result, most global sales
transactions concerning goods are subject to the same set of rules. And, as
the next section observes, a standardized set of legal rules, like the CISG,
for international sales transactions confers significant benefits on
contracting parties, saving them time and money by eliminating the need to
learn about and negotiate over potentially competing legal regimes.
Perhaps more importantly, a standardized set of rules focused on freedom
of contract, as the next section notes that the CISG is, allows the parties
flexibility to tailor their arrangements in ways that many domestic legal
regimes may not.
B. Solutions through Agreements: Freedom of Contract and the CISG’s
Design
As the previous section suggests, widespread agreement on the need
for a uniform law in international sales transactions has been recognized.48
This broad consensus rests on the intuition that a uniform sales law confers

(1990) (stating that the harmonization of international commercial law was one of the “Top Ten”
developments in contract law during the 1980s).
45. See, e.g., Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L L. J. 443, 481 (1989) (stating that the provisions
of the CISG are more “the result of a compromise rather than a consensus”); Monica Kilian, The CISG
and the Problem with Common Law Jurisdictions, 218 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 217–18 (2001)
(“CISG is the culmination of years of work spanning most of the 20th Century, representing
compromises and solutions amenable to all legal systems whose representatives adopted the
Convention.”); Karen Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend”
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 133, 139 (2007) (“A number of scholars have observed that the many
open-ended terms and ambiguities in the Convention were the result of numerous political compromises
reached during the drafting process.”); Koneru, supra note 9, at 105 (“[M]any of [the Convention’s]
provisions reflect the difficult negotiations and compromises the drafters had to make.”).
46. The CISG entered into force a seventy-third country, Armenia, on January 1, 2010. The
Convention also entered into force in Lebanon on December 1, 2009, and in Japan on August 1, 2009.
See UNCITRAL, Status: 1980–United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/
1980CISG_status.html (last visited March 22, 2011).
47. The United Kingdom and India have not adopted the CISG. See id.
48. See generally, e.g., Rene David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1971); HONNOLD, supra note 41, at 3–4. But
see, e.g., Ronald Harry Graveson, The International Unification of Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 4, 5–6
(1968) (stating that “it may be necessary to correct the assumption that uniform law is good in itself and
that the process of unification is one to be encouraged in principle” and advancing the argument that
certain preconditions must be satisfied to warrant development of uniform laws).
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significant benefits on contracting parties. The following section argues
that this intuition, in turn, stems from an acknowledgement that most sales
law rules are intended to become default terms to the extent that parties
either choose to have, or wind up having because of unforeseen exigencies,
gaps in their agreement.49 After briefly recounting this default rule
paradigm, this Part concludes by pointing out that virtually all of the rules
in the CISG are non-mandatory defaults and thus that the CISG embraces a
robust norm of freedom of contract.
1. The Default Rule Paradigm and an International Sales Law
Peter Pfund, the acting Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law for the United States Department of State, presented a
1984 speech to the Senate in support of the adoption of the CISG.50 In his
speech, Pfund argued that the CISG would allow U.S. corporations to
engage in trade with foreign nations and enter into sales that they otherwise
would not have.51 Pfund suggested that without a uniform sales law like the
CISG, U.S. corporations would be dissuaded by the costs associated with
determining what legal regime would govern their international sales
contracts and the unavoidable uncertainties that overlapping legal regimes
created.52
Pfund’s arguments recognized that parties to contracts generally, and
international sales contracts especially, face a significant knowledge
problem. Contracts, as drafted, are always incomplete.53 The inevitability
of incompleteness reflects, to borrow a distinction from H.L.A. Hart, both
our “relative ignorance of fact” and “our relative indeterminacy of aim.”54

49. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 276, 278 (1985).
50. International Sale of Goods, 1984: Hearing on Treaty Doc. No. 98–9 Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 98th Cong. 303-05 (1984) (statement of Peter Pfund acting Assistant Legal Adviser
for Private International Law, Department of State).
51. See id. at 6.
52. See Heidi Stanton, How to Be or Not to Be: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, Article 6, 4 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 428 (1996) (“In light
of these uncertainties, difficulties and expenses, what were once attractive foreign markets suddenly
appear unattractive.”).
53. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Default Rule Project, 6 VIR. J. 84, 85 (2003) (“As an
organizing principle, the notion that contract rules are defaults inevitably leads to the conclusion that all
contracts are inevitably incomplete.”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 595 (2003) (“There is an infinite number of possible future
states and a very large set of possible partner types. When the sum of possible states and partner types is
infinite and contracting is costly, contracts must contain gaps. Parties cannot write contracts about
everything.”).
54. HART, supra note 2, at 135; see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules
and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 822 (1992) (“Parties drafting a contract confront a
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Although many contracts, and most international sales contracts, are
negotiated and entered into by sophisticated parties, often acting with the
assistance of counsel, and although contracts often contain detailed and
extensive provisions seemingly addressing all of the possible future
contingencies that might arise, no contract accounts for every future
contingency.55
First, the costs of attempting to conceive of and negotiate contract
provisions regarding every contingent state of the world might well exceed
the resulting gains from the transaction.56 Such costs include not only the
expense of gathering information about future possibilities, but also
expenses associated with drafting and negotiating provisions to address
each future contingency and error costs, which arise when parties attempt
to draft a clear provision dealing with some future state of the world but
actually draft a provision that is vague or unclear and that results in costly
litigation.57
Second, the costs of enforcing provisions, even if the contingent state
of the world can be anticipated and a provision regarding the contingency
can be drafted efficiently, may outweigh the benefits of the transaction,
serious knowledge problem. Because they cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how
their own purposes may change, they cannot negotiate terms specifically to cover all contingencies.”).
55. Importantly, a contract may be “obligationally” complete by providing for an obligation that
applies in a wide range of circumstances. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete
Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) [hereinafter
Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts]. For instance, a contract might provide that, no matter what, a
seller must deliver 2,000 widgets on January 1, 2010, for a price of $10,000. While such a contract is
free from gaps in the sense that it specifies the parties’ rights and obligations in all states of the world,
the contract remains “informationally” incomplete in the sense that the parties cannot know whether
delivery of the widgets on that date and for that price will truly be efficient. See id.; see also, e.g.,
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814,
n.2 (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation].
A contract may be obligationally complete even though it is informationally incomplete. An
obligationally complete contract might lump together various states and provide for the same
obligations across the states of each lumped set. Yet, such a contract is informationally incomplete
because it fails to discriminate within each set between states of the world that, optimally, call for
different obligations. States of the world reflect both exogenous and endogenous variables. For
example, different oil prices produce different states, but so does the decision of a seller to tender or
not. Each event changes the state of the world and may be paired in the contract with a different
obligation on the buyer.
56. As Clayton Gillette explains, “[t]he passage of time renders complete contracting both
difficult and undesirable, for the costs of allocating risks deemed unlikely to materialize at all, or only
in the distant future, tend to exceed the current value of expected losses from the remote event.”
Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote Risks, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 535 (1990).
57. See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostrisky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of
Opportunism Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L. J. 43, 58 (2007) (“Error costs
arise when courts make erroneous interpretations of words having a variable meaning.”).
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making a complete contract ultimately inefficient.58 For instance, in some
circumstances, verifying to a court or tribunal that the provision has been
breached may require access to information that is prohibitively costly to
obtain. This may be true even if the costs for the parties of observing that
the provision has been breached are low.59 In short, because contracts, as
drafted, are always incomplete, contractual default rules exist to help fill
the gaps.60
These defaults, in turn, promote trade and corresponding gains by
reducing transaction costs, fostering legal neutrality, predictability, and
stability, and improving the accessibility of the law.61 In these respects, a
uniform international sales law does not differ appreciably from a uniform
domestic sales law.62 Presumably, however, as Peter Pfund observed, a
uniform international set of default rules, like the CISG, is more efficient
for international transactors than a patchwork of domestic laws because it
reduces or eliminates costs associated with reaching agreement on a choice
of law, ex ante (or, of addressing conflict of laws rules in the absence of
58. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466,
468 (1980) (“[B]ecause of the costs involved in enumerating and bargaining over contractual
obligations under the full range of relevant contingencies, it is normally impractical to make contracts
which approach completeness.”).
59. Information may be said to be unobservable if the other contracting party cannot perceive it.
Information may be observable but not verifiable if the other party can perceive it but cannot, at a
reasonable case, prove that information to a court or other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 n.2 (2003); see also
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791–95 (1996) (discussing the distinction between
observable information, which is information that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to
obtain, and verifiable information, which is information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to
a designated third-party neutral in the event of a dispute).
60. See Scott, supra note 53, at 85.
61. See, e.g., Jernej Sekolec, Digest of Case Law on the UN Sales Convention: The Combined
Wisdom of Judges and Arbitrators Promoting Uniform Interpretations of the Convention, in THE DRAFT
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS, AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES
CONVENTION 1–2 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 2004) (maintaining that these benefits of reduced
transaction costs are contingent upon uniform interpretation of the CISG); Frank Diedrich, Maintaining
Uniformity in International Uniform Law via Autonomous Interpretation: Software Contracts and the
CISG, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 303, 305 (1996) (describing the CISG as an “ideal compromise” in
contrast to local or domestic law and predicting the potential benefits from applying the CISG rather
than domestic law to international software contracts); Filip De Ly, Opting Out: Some Observations on
the Occasion of the CISG's 25th Anniversary, in QUO VADIS CISG? - CELEBRATING THE 25TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS 26, 40 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2005) (arguing that the CISG “entails a reduction of transaction
costs, facilitates contract management and has psychological and cross-cultural advantages over
domestic sales law”).
62. See, e.g., Goetz et al., supra note 49, at 276, 278 (explaining that domestic default rule sets
governing sales transactions are public goods that maximize the joint welfare of contracting parties by
reducing transaction costs).
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agreement, ex post),63 and the costs of learning about foreign legal
regimes.64 Additionally, an international set of default rules could contain
provisions that offer parties greater flexibility and freedom of contract than
otherwise applicable domestic default rules would offer.
Recognizing that a set of international sales default rules can
theoretically produce value, however, does not necessarily resolve what the
content of the rules should be.65 The process by which lawmakers can and
should determine the substance of sales default rules has, in fact, been a
subject of heated discussion in contract-theory literature, especially over
the last two decades.66 For the purposes of this Article, I assume that most,
though not all, default rules are best understood as attempts by law makers
to anticipate terms that most similarly situated parties would have wanted
to include had they thought about them.67 Such majoritarian defaults
maximize the probability that the terms to which transacting parties are
being held correspond with the ones they intended but failed to express or
imply, and they save the majority of parties the costs of specifying those

63. See, e.g., Peter Winship, Commentary on Professor Kastely’s Rhetorical Analysis, 8 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 623, 629–30 (1988).
64. See Diedrich, supra note 61, at 304–05 (viewing the CISG as a preferable alternative to
interpreting contracts via one party’s domestic laws or even a neutral domestic law).
65. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 396, 396 (2009) (“How to fill gaps in incomplete agreements is perhaps the most important
question in contract law.”).
66. For a particularly good introduction to the subject, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989)
(applying game theory to the question of how lawmakers should create contract default rules to
facilitate efficient contracts); see also, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (employing game theory, but
challenging Ayres and Gertner’s conclusions); Symposium on Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1993) (featuring 17 pieces on theoretical perspectives on contract default
rules); Barnett, supra note 54 (discussing the default rule approach to gap-filling); Jules L. Coleman et
al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (1989) (applying an economic analysis to default rules); Ian Ayres,
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1391 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)).
67. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 596 (“The justification for a default rule is that it
does for parties what they would have done for themselves had their contracting costs been lower.”).
Not all defaults fit this model, of course. Some defaults may be purposefully set, in fact, to something
that the parties would not want in order to induce them to exchange information that they otherwise
might not. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 65, at 91 (explaining penalty defaults are
“purposefully set at what the parties would not want--in order to encourage the parties to reveal
information to each other or third parties”). Additionally, some defaults may exist to protect vulnerable
parties or non-parties who are impacted or potentially impacted by a contractual exchange.
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terms.68 In designing a set of defaults, then, there are at least two critical
dimensions that must be considered.69
First, and perhaps most significantly, lawmakers must determine the
extent to which the law should contain immutable or mandatory
background rules70 in contrast to non-mandatory defaults that supply a term
unless the parties opt out.71 This choice will ultimately reflect the
lawmakers’ view about the degree of contractual freedom that the parties

68. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19
J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 607 (1990) (contending that majoritarian defaults promote efficiency “by
providing widely suitable preformulations, thus eliminating the cost (and the error) of negotiating every
detail of the proposed agreement”). The majoritarian default rule approach favors an “objective
conception of rationality,” and seeks to mimic “a risk allocation the majority of similarly situated
rational actors would have devised were they to bargain costlessly over the question in advance.” Id.;
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in
Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1477 (2004) [hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Embedded
Options]. (“The case for majoritarian default rules in contracts rests on the premise that state
institutions, such as courts and legislatures, sometimes can design contract provisions at lower cost than
the parties could themselves.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 396 (4th ed. 1992)
(stating that default rules should “supply[ ] standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise
have to adopt by express agreement”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle:
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) (stating that
lawmakers should create default terms by asking, “[W]hat arrangements would most bargainers prefer?”
(emphasis in original)); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (positing that default rules should provide “the contract that
most well-informed persons would have adopted if they were to bargain about the matter”); Coleman et
al., supra note 65, at 641 (describing this as a hypothetical bargain approach to contractual gaps where
the goal is to find the rule that “the parties would have made had transaction costs not made their doing
so irrational”).
69. It is possible to conceive of more dimensions. For instance, Professor George Geis has pointed
out that default rules may be more or less “granular,” applying to a precise range of parties or applying
to most or all contracting parties. See George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of
Default Rules, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1109, 1111–12 (2006) (giving the example of the UCC’s differential
treatment of merchants and non-merchants in some situations); see also, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The
Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390–91 (1993)
(identifying six categories of contract defaults).
70. Immutable rules are not variable by the parties. There are several reasons for the law to
impose immutable rules that cannot be contracted out of, as Ayres and Gertner explain. “There is
surprising consensus among academics . . . on two normative bases for immutability. Put most simply,
immutable rules are justifiable if society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties
outside the contract.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 66, at 88.
71. See id. at 87. Courts (and other legal decision-makers) become involved in supplying default
rules when the parties fail to resolve a matter by express contract ex ante. Questions of the legitimacy of
legal intervention in such cases and the appropriate framework to use in supplying terms are examined
in Coleman et al., supra note 66; see also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and
Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 783, 790–91 (1992) (critiquing Jules Coleman’s rational bargaining theory as a basis for
choosing default rules and elevating importance of consent theory); Goetz & Scott, supra note 62, at
266–70 (examining the way in which the system of state-supplied terms interferes with contractual
innovation).
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should enjoy. Contracting parties, of course, are more limited in their
freedom if the default set contains more mandatory background rules. On
the other hand, parties can choose to ignore non-mandatory default rules by
adopting, in their contract, workable alternatives. Non-mandatory defaults,
in essence, assume that contracting parties are the best judges of how to
maximize joint welfare and allow them to tailor their contracts to suit their
transaction-specific preferences. “By enacting a [non-mandatory] default
rule to govern a contingency . . . lawmakers implicitly render a
determination that the desires of the parties to a transaction will be
permitted to take precedence over other policy concerns.”72
Second, lawmakers must decide whether to frame default norms as
rules or standards.73 I discuss this dimension of default rules at length in
Part III, but for now it is sufficient to note that parties regularly choose to
employ a mix of rules and standards when they craft express terms to their
deal.74 It is, thus, reasonable to conclude that both rules and standards can
be advantageous to parties. On first glance, at least, it is not then apparent
whether the default rule set should be comprised of rules or standards or
some combination of the two.75
With respect to the first dimension, as the next section argues, the
drafters of the CISG chose to adopt an almost exclusively non-mandatory
default set. Indeed, the CISG embraces an expansive view of contractual
freedom, allowing parties whose contracts are governed by its provisions to
have virtually unfettered discretion to adjust the default rules governing
their transactions. With respect to the second dimension, as Part III
discusses, the CISG drafters chose to cast, in significant measure, the
default set as standards rather than rules.
2. The CISG’s Structure and Contents: An Expansive View of
Contractual Freedom

72. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
611 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 1, 3 (1993) (arguing that default rules may be categorized as being simple rules,
complex rules, simple standards or complex standards).
74. See, e.g., Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457 (“To be sure, commercial parties often include
broad standards of reasonableness or effort in their contracts. Commercial contracts regularly invoke
factors such as ‘best efforts,’ ‘reasonable expenses,’ and ‘reasonable withholding of consent.’”).
75. Notably, as I discuss in more detail in Part III, Professors Gillette and Scott argue to the
contrary. They maintain that the default rule set should be comprised primarily of rules and that “the
parties can always include [standards] in their contract at relatively low cost” when such standards are
efficient. See id.
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Though the CISG establishes a fairly straightforward normative
framework for international sales contracts,76 its design is innovative. The
innovation rests, as the previous section suggested, on the Convention’s
fundamental commitment to a robust freedom of contract.77 This
commitment can be seen most obviously in Article 6, which states
concisely but powerfully that “[t]he parties may exclude the application of
the Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions.”78
The debates at the 1980 conference confirm that Article 6 is to be
taken literally and that parties may indeed derogate from or vary the effect
of all the provisions of the Convention other than Article 12.79
Accordingly, “Article 6 guarantees party autonomy over both the conflict
rules and the substantive law.”80
The right of the parties to contract out of the Convention entirely
implements a generally recognized principle of private international law
according to which the parties to an international contract of sale of goods
76. Although CISG has a wide scope of application, applying “to contracts of sale of goods
between parties whose places of business are in different [contracting] States,” it also has significant
limitations. CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1). First, it does not apply to consumer transactions or mixed
contracts for the sale of goods and services where the services are the “preponderant part of the
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods.” See id. at art. 2(a) & 3(2). Similarly, it does not apply
to the sale of certain kinds of property, such as stocks, shares, investment securities, money, electricity
or ships, vessels or aircraft. Id. at art. 2(b)-(f). The Convention “does not apply to the liability of the
seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person,” id. at art. 5, and Article 4
explains that matters of contract validity and the effect of a contract on property rights in the goods sold
are beyond the scope of the convention. Id. at art. 4. Instead, the Convention “governs only the
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from
such a contract.” Id. at art. 4. Accordingly, the CISG does not address unconscionability, capacity
defenses, fraudulent inducement or the rights of a bona fide purchaser to goods that turn out to have
been stolen.
77. See Tom McNamara, U.N. Sale of Goods Convention: Finally Coming of Age?, 32 COLO.
LAW. 11, 16 (2003) (“Many Convention commentators have argued that the most fundamental provision
of the Convention is the ‘freedom of contract’ principle.”); see also, e.g., Richard D. Kearney,
Developments in Private International Law, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 724, 728 (1987) (noting that freedom of
contract is a fundamental tenant of international sales law); Franco Ferrari, Remarks on the Autonomy
and the Uniform Application of the CISG on the Occasion of its Tenth Anniversary, INT’L CONTR. ADV.
33 (1998); JAN RAMBERG, Autonomy of Contract and Non-mandatory Law, in SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES
IN LAW 143 (1993); Ulrich Schroeter, Freedom of Contract: Comparison Between Provisions of the
CISG (Article 6) and Counterpart Provisions of the Principles of European Contract Law, 11
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COMM. L. & ARB. 259, 260 (2002) (discussing at length the notion of freedom of
contract embraced by the CISG).
78. CISG, supra note 3, art. 6.
79. Peter Winship, The Scope of the Vienna Convention on the International Sale Contracts, in
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS 1, 32 (Nina M. Galston & Hans Smit, eds., 1984).
80. PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 35 (1st ed. 1986).
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are permitted to choose the applicable law.81 In the absence of a uniform
law, however, the parties’ choice, of course, was restricted to existing
domestic laws. Article 6 makes it clear that, despite the existence of the
Convention, contracting parties remain free to decide what should be the
proper law governing their transaction. Accordingly, Article 6’s opt-out
provision, while significant, is not particularly novel.
The right of derogation and variation, however, is innovative. Even
where the Convention applies as the proper law of the contract, the parties,
pursuant to Article 6, may adapt the Convention to their particular needs
with virtually no limitations.82 They may do so by excluding some of the
Convention’s provisions, agreeing on contractual terms to supplement the
Convention, or modifying the provisions of the Convention. Although
many domestic sales laws grant the parties at least some freedom to
achieve similar outcomes,83 such laws tend to contain more mandatory
terms.84

81. See, e.g., Diedrich, supra note 61, at 306–07 (noting that parties to an international sales
contract can choose the law applicable to their transaction pursuant to “the universally recognized
principle of party autonomy under non-unified private international law”); Francis A. Gabor, Stepchild
of the New Lex Mercatoria: Private International Law from the United States Perspective, 8 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 538, 542 (1988) (noting that a survey of conflict of law rules “leads to the conclusion
that the principle of choice of law freedom of the parties is almost universally recognized at the present
time”).
82. See, e.g., Lachmi Singh & Benjamin Leisinger, A Law for International Sale of Goods: A
Reply to Michael Bridge, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 161, 164 (2008) (“It logically follows from this that the
parties are free to tailor specific provisions of the CISG to their needs.”); Peter Winship, Aircraft and
International Sales Conventions, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 1053, 1060 (1984) (“[The CISG’s] rules are
supplementary in nature and the parties have virtually unlimited freedom to contract out of some or all
of the convention’s rules if they so choose.”); Arthur Fakes, The Application of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to Computer, Software, and Database
Transactions, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 559, 574 (1990) (“The parties may agree in their contract that the
Convention does not apply to the transaction and thereby nullify its operation. In fact, the parties can
eliminate or alter the application of specific treaty provisions by including in the contract the altered or
totally different terms. Such capabilities illustrate the extreme flexibility of the treaty and its gap-filler
nature.”). A few commentators, however, argue that, in addition to Article 6’s express declaration that
the parties may not derogate from or vary the application of Article 12, the CISG contains several
mandatory defaults that parties should not be able to change by agreement. See, e.g., Bojidara Borisova,
Freedom of Contract: Remarks on the Manner in Which the UNIDROIT Principles May be Used to
Interpret or Supplement Article 6 of the CISG, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 39, 44 (John Felemegas ed., 2007).
83. For instance, the UCC provides that, with some exceptions, “[t]he effect of provisions of this
Act may be varied by agreement.” U.C.C. § 1-302; see also id. §§ 4-103(a); 4A-501(a); 5-103(c).
84. For instance, the UCC has a number of mandatory defaults including, among many others, the
statute of frauds. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (the obligation of good faith and fair dealing); id. § 1-302 (the
parol evidence rule); id. § 2-202 (statute of limitations); id. §§ 2-725, 2A-506, 3-118, 4-111, 5-115, 6110, and certain rules regarding warranties and disclaimers; see also id. §§ 2-316 (prohibiting the

BLAIR_PROOF3

288

3/28/2011 2:53:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:269

Perhaps more importantly, even if a domestic default rule is nonmandatory, it may well be “sticky.”85 In other words, parties might find
themselves locked into the default even though they might prefer some
alternative provision. Such stickiness might result from a variety of causes,
including an inordinate focus on the status quo or a concern about negative
signaling. As I argue in more detail in Part III.B, however, there are good
reasons to believe that Article 6 helps render default norms under the CISG
far less sticky, allowing parties virtually unfettered freedom to opt-out of
them when doing so will maximize the parties’ joint contract surplus.
Article 6 is an alerting rule—a rule that tells “private parties the necessary
and sufficient conditions for contracting around a default,”86 and those
conditions are extremely minimal.
In short, then, Article 6 serves the dual purposes of allowing parties
the freedom to opt in or out of the CISG entirely and allowing the parties
who do opt into the CISG to tailor specific provisions to meet their
individual transactional goals. When paired with the Convention’s
underlying goal of reducing the costs of international sales and thus
enhancing the welfare of contracting parties, this commitment to freedom
of contract demonstrates that the drafters of the CISG intended to promote,
first and foremost, the intentions of the contracting parties, allowing them
to design their deals in whatever ways would maximize their perceived
gains from trade. As the next two Parts argue, the conventional
understanding of hard CISG interpretation cases potentially undermines
this fundamental premise by attempting transform the default rule set from
standards into rules.
II. THE CURRENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE CISG’S
INTERPRETATIVE SCHEME
The CISG has been widely adopted.87 The United States did so in
1986, making the CISG a self-executing treaty.88 Since coming into force

negation or limitation of express warranties and imposing strict rules on governing other warranty
disclaimers).
85. See generally, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006) (discussing the stickiness of contract default rules).
86. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006).
87. See UNCITRAL, supra note 46.
88. HOWARD O. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS §23:6 (Supp. 2007). By making the
CISG self-executing, Congress intended for it to have automatic domestic effect as federal law upon
ratification. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n. 2 (2008) (“What we mean by ‘selfexecuting’ is that the treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.”).
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in 1988,89 more than 5000 court and arbitral decisions applying the CISG
from forty countries have been rendered.90 Although a large and expanding
membership to the CISG promises to formally increase the harmonization
of international sales law, diversity of membership means that hundreds of
different tribunals from different countries are tasked with the obligation of
interpreting that law. The problem, of course, is that “even when outward
uniformity [of rules] is achieved, . . . uniform application of the agreed
rules is by no means guaranteed, as in practice different countries almost
inevitably come to put different interpretations upon the same enacted
words.”91 Or, to put it more succinctly, “[e]ven if you get uniform law, you
won’t get uniform results.”92
Critics of the CISG have, in fact, highlighted the threat of uneven
application, arguing that the benefits of uniform international sales law are
minimal.93 But even supporters of the CISG have recognized that national
courts will inevitably be the conscious or subconscious victims of
“homeward trend.”94 The CISG, in other words,
will often be applied by tribunals . . . who will be intimately
familiar only with their own domestic law. These tribunals,
regardless of their merit, will be subject to a natural
tendency to read the international rules in light of the legal
ideas that have been imbedded at the core of their
intellectual formation. The mind sees what the mind has
means of seeing.95
Such a homeward trend, most commentators agree, tends to erode the
uniformity of the CISG with “[d]ivergent or contradictory interpretations,
like the application of rules of different countries lead[ing] to different
judgments.”96 Indeed, commentators have gone so far as to claim that “the
single most important source of non-uniformity in the CISG is the different
89. See Joanne M. Darkey, A U.S. Court's Interpretation of Damage Provisions Under the U.N.
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Preliminary Step Towards an
International Jurisprudence of CISG or a Missed Opportunity?, 15 J.L. & COM. 139, 139 (1995)
(discussing the details about how the convention came into force).
90. See PACE DATABASE, supra note 29.
91. R.J.C. Munday, The Uniform Interpretation of International Conventions, 27 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 450, 450 (1978).
92. John Honnold, The Sales Convention in Action -- Uniform International Words: Uniform
Application?, 8 J.L. & COM. 207, 207 (1988).
93. See, e.g, Stephan, supra note 11, at 746–50.
94. John Honnold coined the term “homeward trend,” suggesting that it is a regrettable but
inevitable consequence of the unification process. HONNOLD, supra note 4, at 1.
95. Id. at 1.
96. László Réczei, Process and Value of the Unification of Commercial Law: Lessons for the
Future Drawn from the Past 25 years, 25th UNCITRAL Congress 6 (1992).
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background assumptions and conceptions that those charged with
interpreting and applying the Convention bring to the task.”97
To combat this homeward trend, commentators, or at least
commentators in favor of the continued existence of the CISG, have read
Article 7 of the CISG and its interpretive scheme narrowly, finding that
there are only two basic categories of hard cases: internal gap and external
gap cases. They then insist that, with respect to the larger category of hard
cases—cases falling within the scope of the Convention but not expressly
settled by it—tribunals must interpret the CISG “autonomously,” looking
only to the decisions of other tribunals interpreting the CISG, using the
CISG’s general principles to deduce the correct interpretation, and avoiding
the tendency to look to or rely on domestic contract law for guidance. By
eschewing reliance on domestic law, at least for the largest category of
interpretive challenges, it is hoped that tribunals will ultimately build an
independent, internationally consistent set of interpretive outcomes under
the Convention.
The next two sections discuss, in some detail, this conventional
understanding of the CISG’s interpretive framework, focusing on Article
7(1) and 7(2). The third section in this part concludes by providing a brief
summary of the conventional approach and highlighting its shortcomings.
A. Article 7(1)
“Article 7 of the Convention itself undertakes the formidable task of
guiding judges.”98 Described by some as “the single most important
provision in ensuring the future success of the Convention,”99 Article 7(1)
states: “(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”100
Ascertaining precisely what Article 7(1)’s exhortation regarding the “need
97. Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations
on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L.
& COM. 187, 200 (1998); see also Harry M. Flechtner, Funky Mussels, A Stolen Car, and Decrepit
Used Shoes: Non-Conforming Goods and Notice Thereof Under the United Nations Sales Convention
(“CISG”), 26 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (“The most significant challenge arising from the CISG’s
success is how to maintain the Convention as a source of uniform international sales rules (its primary
function) when it is being applied by courts, arbitral tribunals and lawyers in such a large group of
countries with diverse domestic legal cultures.”) [hereinafter Flechtner, Funky Mussels]; Spaic, supra
note 9, at 239–40 (“The main issue with respect to the CISG’s divergent interpretation lies with the
interpreters themselves, the different courts and tribunals who are likely to be influenced by national
legal concepts and legal systems.”).
98. Koneru, supra note 9, at 106.
99. Id.
100. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, supra note 3, art. 7.
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to promote uniformity” means, however, has proven difficult.101 Certainly
Article 7(1) encourages member states to keep in mind the nature and
aspirations of the Convention, but it is unclear whether a distinction should
be drawn between Article 7(1)’s emphasis on the need for uniformity and
its call for recognition of the international character of the CISG.102 Some
commentators maintain that “the need to promote uniformity” is no more
than “a logical consequence” of interpreting the Convention according to
its “international character.”103 Indeed, Professor Aneta Spiac has argued
that “[i]n the CISG, the elements of ‘internationality’ and ‘uniformity’ are
interrelated thematically and structurally because of their position in the
same Part and Article of the CISG.”104 Regardless of whether or not the
two criteria are completely coextensive, however, Paragraph 1 of the
Secretariat Commentary to the 1978 draft seems to confirm that the two
criteria in Article 7(1) are, at the least, complementary:
National rules on the law of sales of goods are subject to
sharp divergencies [sic] in approach and concept. Thus, it is
especially important to avoiding differing constructions of
the provisions of this Convention by national courts, each
dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the
country of the forum. To this end Article 7 emphasizes the
importance, in the interpretation and application of the
provisions of the Convention, of having due regard for the

101. Much of the commentary on Article 7(1) focuses on the meaning of what might be considered
the provision’s central term, “good faith.” See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 686, 778–82 (1998) (discussing the disagreements over the meaning
of good faith arguing that it should have an expansive role in the CISG and should be regarded as a
“general principle” under Article 7(2)); Harry Flechtner, Comparing the General Good Faith
Provisions of the PECL and the UCC: Appearance and Reality, 13 PACE INT’L L. REV. 295, 289–301
(2001). Notably, however, “good faith” is not defined in the Convention—it is not “even accompanied
by a definition as indefinite as the ‘observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing,’ the
definition of good faith within the Uniform Commercial Code.” Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott,
The Political Economy of International Sales Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 452 (2005).
102. For example, Professor John Honnold initially distinguishes the two principles but then
discusses only the legislative history of the criterion regarding the Convention’s “international
character.” See HONNOLD, supra note 41, at 117–20.
103. See Bonell, supra note 37, at 72. Professor Fletchner similarly seems to agree that the two
criteria are effectively coextensive. According to Professor Flechtner, the drafters of the CISG sought
“to avoid, where possible, terminology commonly used in (and thus more likely to convey unintended
meanings derived from) domestic sales law, particularly where the terminology is associated with a
particular legal tradition.” Flechtner, supra note 96, at 5. This drafting technique, he goes on to say,
reflects “the effort to create sales rules that will be interpreted and applied ‘autonomously’—i.e., in a
fashion (as expressed in Article 7(1)) that reflects the Convention’s ‘international character’ and the
need for ‘uniformity in its application.’” Id. at 5–6.
104. Spaic, supra note 9, at 241.
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international character of the Convention and the need to
promote uniformity.105
Accordingly, most commentators agree that subdivision (1) generally
encourages local and national courts and tribunals to develop an
“internationalist culture.”106 Because of its freedom from domestic norms,
the interpretive methodology derived from such an internationalist culture
has somewhat confusingly been referred to as the “autonomous” approach
to interpretation.107
Significantly, however, this autonomous approach, despite its name,
does not suggest that a tribunal is barred from considering the decisions of
other tribunals faced with similar CISG interpretive challenges. In fact, the
autonomous interpretive approach encourages, if not compels, tribunals to
consider what other tribunals interpreting the CISG have done.108 Most
CISG commentators—and an increasing number of national courts—agree
that the command ‘to have regard’ requires that particular consideration be
given to CISG ‘foreign case law’, i.e., relevant decisions emanating from
105. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Prepared by the Secretariat, Official Records, art. 6, cmt. 1., Prepared for the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.97/5 (1979).
106. ALAN P. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 3 (2d ed. 1999); see also Alexander S.
Komarov, Internationality, Uniformity and Observance of Good Faith as a Criteria in Interpretation of
CISG: Some Remarks on Article 7(1), 25 J.L. & COM. 75, 76 (2005) (“[I]t was also stressed that a
considerable merit of the paragraph would lay in the fact that it proclaimed an up-to-date legal policy in
harmony with the exigencies of world trade which postulated that ‘no recourse to national law should
be admitted in interpretation.’”).
The drafters of the CISG, in fact, attempted to avoid “as far as possible the use of what may be called
legal shorthand, that is, the use of terms of art peculiar to the system of law prevailing in one group of
countries signing a convention.” OTTO CHARLES GILES, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL LAW: AN ESSAY ON
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS 39 (1970). They wanted, instead, to develop a
“neutral language” that could replace the idioms used by national legal systems with an international
system designed to reflect the realities of commercial life. See, e.g., CESARE M. BIANCA & MICHEAL J.
BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION
74 (1987) (“Even in the exceptional cases where terms or concepts were employed which are peculiar to
a given national law, it was never intended to use them in their traditional meaning.”).
107. Komarov, supra note 105, at 78.
108. See, e.g., Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 44, at 64–65. HONNOLD, supra note 41, at
125 (“The Convention’s requirement of regard for ‘uniformity in its application’ calls for tribunals to
consider [foreign] interpretations of the Convention.”); Flechtner, Funky Mussels, supra note 96, at 2
(“There is consensus among CISG commentators that one important tool in fulfilling [the requirement
of uniformity] is consultation of past CISG decisions, particularly those rendered by tribunals in
jurisdictions other than that of the interpreter.”); Spaic, supra note 9, at 240 (“Thus, uniformity can only
be achieved if different tribunals take into consideration the decisions of other national courts on the
same set of circumstances.”); Franco Ferrari, CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17
J.L. & COM. 245, 254 (1998) (“The interpreter must consider decisions rendered by judicial bodies of
foreign jurisdictions, because it is possible that the same or similar questions have already been
examined by other States’ courts.”).
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courts in (other) CISG Contracting States.109 Thus, instead of having a store
of domestic case law, commentators advocate for the creation of an
international body of precedent (though admittedly nonbinding)110 to which
tribunals can look to determine the outcome of a given case.111 This
approach emphasizes “awareness of and respect for, but not necessarily
blind obedience to, interpretations of the CISG from outside one’s own
legal culture.”112
In circumstances where there are diverging interpretations by different
tribunals, the principles of autonomous interpretation suggest that the
interpreting tribunal should harmonize such decisions. “[C]ourts [should
serve] two primary functions [in their roles as informal appellate courts].
First, they would look to decisions of foreign courts for guidance. Second,
they would actively unify international sales law by distinguishing
seemingly inconsistent prior decisions and by harmonizing differences in
foreign interpretations.”113
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, harmonization has proven
challenging.114 Because “the CISG judicial ‘pyramid’ is essentially flat, no
court sits atop with the authority to iron out differences in opinion among
the numerous . . . judicial hierarchies spread across the globe.”115
Nevertheless, many commentators maintain that all tribunals are tasked

109. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, International Sales Law and the Inevitability of Forum Shopping: A
Comment on Tribunale Di Rimini, 26 November 2002, 23 J.L. & COMM. 169, 172 n.12 (2003-2004).
110. See, e.g., Singh & Leisinger, supra note 81, at 180–81 (noting that “there is no such a thing as
‘stare decisis’ with regard to interpretations of provisions of the CISG by courts or tribunals in other
countries”); Ferrari, supra note 107, at 259–60 (criticizing the notion that foreign CISG case law should
have the value of precedent).
111. See Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano
(Italy), 12 July 2000, 6 UNIFORM L. REV. / REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME, 203, 206 (2001).
112. Flechtner, supra note 96, at 188; see also, e.g., Koneru, supra note 9, at 108 (“[I]t is important
to recognize that giving an international interpretation does not mean merely choosing a domestic
interpretation from another country.”).
113. Larry A. DiMatteo, et. al., The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of
Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299, 304 (2004).
114. Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conventione? Some Thoughts about Opt-Outs, Computer
Programs and Preëmption Under the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 263, 269 (2003) (“So while we find many examples of harmonious Convention interpretation,
the CISG musicians do not all play the same tune; indeed, domestic idiosyncrasies sometimes make it
difficult for outsiders to a given national system to even ‘hear’ the message sounded by foreign
precedent.”).
115. Joseph Lookofsky, Digesting CISG Case Law: How Much Regard Should We Have?, 8
VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 181, 185 (2004).
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with the job of doing their utmost to separate the mellifluent from the
discordant in CISG interpretive matters.116
In short, most commentators read Article 7(1) as an attempt to limit
jurisdictional variance by admonishing tribunals to heed the CISG’s
“international character.” In this role, these commentators view Article 7(1)
as a succinct restatement of the underlying legis ratio, or purpose, of the
entire convention.117 As the next section argues, most commentators
maintain that, when paired with Article 7(2), the international character of
the entire convention demands that the autonomous method, including
recourse to an international store of precedent, be used to resolve all
internal gap cases.
B. Article 7(2)
Article 7(2) establishes the basic categories of interpretive challenges
that tribunals face when dealing with the CISG. This subdivision states that
it is addressing “matters governed by this Convention [but] not expressly
settled in it.”118 It goes on to declare that such matters “are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the
absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue
of the rules of private international law.”119
This statement of scope, I contend, implicitly delineates three basic
categories of “matters”:
First, there are matters governed by the Convention but settled in it
(Category I Cases).
Second, there are the matters expressly being dealt with by the
subdivision—matters that are governed by the Convention but not settled in
it (Category II Cases).

116. See id.; Flechtner, Funky Mussels, supra note 96, at 9–10 (“The deference due a CISG opinion
is based on how well it satisfies Article 7(1)’s mandates to interpret the Convention with regard to its
international character and the need to promote uniformity in its application.”).
117. “Ratio legis” refers to the purpose or “soul” of the law.
[I]t is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law, and our law (like all
others) consists of two parts, viz. of body and soul, the letter of the law is the body of the law, and the
sense and reason of the law is the soul of the law, quià ratio legis est anima legis. And the law may be
resembled to a nut, which has a shell and a kernel within, the letter of the law represents the shell, and
the sense of it the kernel, and as you will be no better for the nut if you make use only of the shell, so
you will receive no benefit by the law, if you rely only upon the letter, and as the fruit and profit of the
nut lies in the kernel, and not in the shell, so the fruit and profit of the law consists in the sense more
than in the letter.
Eyston v. Studd, Plowden, 75 Eng. Rep. 459, 465 (1573).
118. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2).
119. Id.
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Third, there are matters not governed by the Convention, either
because they are expressly or implicitly excluded (Category III Cases).
Importantly, questions about Category I Cases are generally not hard,
implicating, as they do, Judge Easterbrook’s universal rule of
interpretation—if the statute is clear, apply it. Accordingly, this article does
not address Category I Cases. Questions about Category II and III Cases,
however, may be hard. In fact, Category II Cases are quintessential hard
CISG cases and the primary focus of this Article.
1. Matters Governed by But Not Settled in the CISG (Category II
Cases)
To date, most commentators and tribunals have treated all questions
about Category II Cases as homogenous. Interpretive challenges arising
from Category II matters involve so-called intra legem or internal gaps.120
Such gaps are formed, according to one view,
when the legislator is not aware of a problem. The reason
for this is often that the problem did not exist at the time the
law was made. The problems arise out of a change in the
conditions of life caused by technical progress. It is also
possible that the legislator simply overlooked the
problem.121
Internal gaps, then, may be seen as sorts of mistakes, albeit
understandable and even inevitable ones.122 As is often true with mistakes
in general, the goal of conventional approaches to CISG interpretation is to
permanently fix such mistakes.
Another view sees internal gaps as simply byproducts of the necessary
concessions that were made in order to get the Convention ratified.123 The
drafters, in other words, did not overlook problems so much as they looked

120. See Ferrari, supra note 36, at 215–21.
121. Gert Brandner, Admissibility of Analogy in Gap-filling and its Relationship to the General
Principles under the CISG, CISG DATABASE, PACE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW
(1999), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/brandner.html#N_25_.
122. See id.
123. Karen Halverson Cross, Parole Evidence Under the CISG: The “Homeward Trend”
Reconsidered, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 133, 139–40 (2007); Koneru, supra note 9, at 5 (“[M]any of [the
Convention’s] provisions reflect the difficult negotiations and compromises the drafters had to make.”);
Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 23 INT’L L. 443, 450–52 (1989) (discussing in some detail the need for
compromise during the drafting of the CISG).
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away from them in order to get broad-ranging agreement on the content of
the Convention.124
Even if this later explanation of internal gaps more accurately reflects
the drafting history of the Convention than the “mistake” view, however,
the bottom line is the same: commentators believe that tribunals
interpreting the Convention should, over time, permanently fill the gaps left
as a result of the drafting process. For instance, Professor Kastely, in an
early article discussing the Convention, argued that “[c]ourts and
commentators should strive to develop an international jurisprudence of
Convention interpretation . . . [which will] articulate the detailed meanings
of the general principles of the Convention.”125 Thus, over time, the
general, open-ended provisions of the Convention would slowly be
transformed into a set of clear and detailed rules.126 Similarly, Professor
Spaic argues that “[t]he creation and adoption of the CISG are only the
preliminary steps towards uniformity in international sales law. It is the
interpretation—and uniform application—of the uniform law that will
complete the process.”127
To fill the gaps, the conventional view of the CISG’s interpretive
scheme reads Article 7(2) as establishing a two-tier hierarchy. First,
tribunals are directed to settle a question about a matter falling into
Category II hard CISG Cases in conformity with the Convention’s general
principles.128 Second, only if no such principles can be found (“in the
absence of such principles”), can a tribunal look to some domestic contract
law—a domestic law “applicable by virtue of the rules of private

124. See, e.g., Garro, supra note 123, at 471–73 (discussing the “uneasy” compromise reached
regarding notice of noncomformity and arguing that this compromise, which hinges on several openended terms like “reasonable,” was necessary to accommodate the competing visions of the drafters).
125. Amy H. Kastely, The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention, 63 WASH. L. REV. 607, 651 (1988) (emphasis
added).
126. In this respect, Professor Kastely’s argument may reflect the widely accepted notion that the
relationship between rules and standards is dialectical, at least in common law systems where precedent
accretes over time. As standards are applied by courts, they acquire increasing specificity, slowly
becoming more rule-like. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, The Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy
and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REV. 305, 376–79 (2003) (also observing that rules, over time, tend to become
more standard-like as courts question the application of specific norms to particular facts).
127. Spaic, supra note 9, at 258 (emphasis added).
128. Obviously, the question of how courts should ascertain what counts as a “general principle”
has generated a great deal of scholarly thought. See, e.g., Koneru, supra note 9, at 115–23 (discussing
appropriate methods for ascertaining the general principles of the Convention); JOHN O. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 102 (2d ed. 1991) (suggesting that general principles should
only be found to exist when they are “moored to premises that underlie specific provisions of the
Convention”).
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international law”129—to resolve the question. In other words, it is “[o]nly
as a last resort” that a tribunal may settle the matter in accord with the
“domestic law indicated by the conflict of law rules of the forum” and thus
interpret a case in a non-uniform manner.130
The method by which tribunals are to ascertain the content of the
“general principles” of the CISG, in turn, while not self-evident, has been
widely accepted to be the autonomous method detailed in the previous
section.131 Tribunals, in other words, should adopt an interpretive
perspective, whenever possible, that views the CISG as self-contained.132
129. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2).
130. Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International Sales
Law, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (1995). Ironically, this approach potentially results in there being an
intra legem gap. Theoretically (and very likely in many actual cases), a court might be able to deduce
one or more underlying principles of the CISG relevant to an interpretive question. These principles,
however, may conflict or ultimately prove to be insufficient to answer the question. Read narrowly,
subdivision (2) might prohibit a court from resorting to the forum’s domestic law in such a case, since a
principle is available.
It is worth noting that, according to the late E. Allan Farnsworth, who represented the United States on
the CISG drafting committee, Article 7(2) was a compromise between civilian and common-law
traditions:
The more numerous civilians had some success. What they got, in article 7(2), was this: “Questions
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which it is based” . . . . But we common lawyers also had
some success. What we got, in the balance of article 7(2) was this: “In the absence of such principles,
[matters not expressly settled by the Convention are to be settled] in conformity with the law applicable
by virtue of the rules of private international law.” Here is a recognition of the Swiss cheese theory:
Look at the Convention as a piece of Swiss cheese, and, if you see a hole in the Convention, look
through it to the backdrop of the law that would otherwise apply under choice of law rules. This
concession to the common lawyers was all the more remarkable because the predecessor of the Vienna
Convention--the less widely adopted Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods--had said exactly
the opposite.
E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer’s View of His Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA. L. REV. 227, 231
(1996).
131. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1). Many commentators, it should be noted, argue that the principle
of autonomous interpretation permeates the entire Convention. See, e.g., Komarov, supra note 105, at
76–77 (“The general observation of means of interpretation of the Convention may be supplemented by
the reference to an interesting remark relating to evaluation of the rule stipulated in Article 7(1). It was
suggested that because most of the articles, if not all, manifest a purpose and the policy, in a sense the
entire Convention is a cross-reference to this article.”) (citing Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: The Elusive Goal of Uniformity,
in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 21 (Cornell
Int’l Law Journal ed. 1995). It is not, therefore, merely a product of the conjunction of Articles 7(1) and
7(2).
132. See, e.g., SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 44, at 10 (finding it imperative for
interpreters of the CISG to become familiar with uniform international concepts, and to “understand
them as autonomous concepts and to counter the danger of their being interpreted in the light of the
familiar solutions of domestic law”); BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 25, at 74 (having regard to the
“international character” of the Convention under Article 7(1) “implies the necessity of interpreting its
terms and concepts autonomously, i.e., in the context of the Convention itself and not by referring to the

BLAIR_PROOF3

298

3/28/2011 2:53:35 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:269

Autonomous interpretation, according to these scholars, must divorce itself
from domestic law as an influence on questions of CISG interpretation. 133
Most commentators agree that, as an initial matter, the CISG’s general
principles can and should be filled by analogical extensions of specific
provisions.134 These general principles can also be derived from scholarly
works on the CISG, and more controversially, many argue that they can be
found within the UNIDROIT Principles.135 The general principles,
however, are seen as fixed answers that may be used, once found, to
permanently plug interpretive gaps left by the Convention’s vague
language.
In brief, the conventional approach to CISG interpretive challenges
arising from an internal gap—arising because a matter falls within the
scope of the Convention but it is not settled by it—strives to fill the gaps
left by the Convention drafters both for purposes of the pending case and
for all future cases. The primary mechanism for accomplishing this goal is
the autonomous principle of interpretation, which should be, in the
conventional commentators’ view, applied to all hard cases arising from
internal gaps. By following the autonomous interpretation principle in all

meaning which might traditionally be attached to them within a particular domestic law”); Franco
Ferrari, Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 Uniform Sales Law, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 200–
01 (1994) (arguing that Article 7(1) requires the interpreter to read the Convention, “not . . . through the
lenses of domestic law, but . . . against an international background”).
133. See Franco Ferrari, Applying the CISG in a Truly Uniform Manner: Tribunale di Vigevano
(Italy), 12 July 2000, 6 REVUE DE DROIT UNIFORME [UNIFORM L. REV.] 203, 204 (2001); John E.
Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365, 367 (1998) (stating that
autonomous interpretation requires that a tribunal “transcend its domestic perspective and become a
different court that is no longer influenced by the law of its own nation state”).
134. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, Interpretation of the Convention and Gap Filling: Article 7, in
DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST 138, 160 (Franco Ferrari et al. eds., 1989); FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH
MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 58–59 (1992).
135. See John Felemegas, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods: Article 7 and Uniform Interpretation, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 115, 291–94 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed., 2001) (asserting that
the UNIDROIT principles have been and should continue to be applied by tribunals to interpret the
CISG); Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Contracts and the CISG:
Alternative or Complementary Instrument?, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 26, 33–36 (1996) (arguing that the
UNIDROIT Principles may be used to interpret and supplement some aspects of the CISG); Ulrich
Magnus, General Principles of UN-Sales Law, 59 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT (Ger.) 492 (1995)
(characterizing the UNIDROIT Principles as “additional general principles” in the context of the CISG
because of correspondence between them and the provisions and general principles of the CISG). But
see Ferrari, supra note 133, at 170–71 (arguing that supporting comments are often accompanied by a
warning that the UNIDROIT Principles go further than the CISG); Troy Keily, Good Faith and the
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 3 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. LAW
& ARB. 15, 35 (1999) (describing the argument that the UNIDROIT Principles can provide general
principles for use in CISG interpretation as “flimsy” and reiterating the warning that UNIDROIT
Principles go “well beyond the CISG”).
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such cases, it is believed that interpretive outcomes can be normalized
across signatory states.
2. Matters Not Governed by the Convention (Category III Cases)
Just as tribunals and commentators have treated questions about
Category II Cases as homogenous, so too have they treated all questions
about matters falling into Category III as homogenous. Matters falling into
the third category are outside of the scope of the CISG. They fall into what
have been described (somewhat confusingly) as external gaps or gaps
praeter legem.136 Because the CISG does not address questions related to
matters falling into these external gaps, the standard view is that they may
be directly settled by domestic law.
Though these external gaps are classified, initially, the same, some
commentators recognize that there are differences in the natures of these
gaps. Accordingly, the ascertainment of which domestic law will be
applied will depend on the type of external gap the tribunal faces. If the
external gap is one of procedural law, recourse will be had to the law of the
forum.137 For other types of external gaps, some commentators have
suggested that the appropriate domestic law should be that made applicable
by the rules of private international law.138
For purposes of this Article, the important point is that commentators
believe that the only truly acceptable non-uniformity of interpretive
outcomes exists with respect to external gaps.
C. Brief Summary of the Conventional Approach to CISG Interpretive
Challenges
The conventional approach to CISG interpretation, in short, relies on
Article 7(1) to derive the overarching goal of uniformity of interpretative
outcomes as well as the methodology for achieving this goal—autonomous
interpretation.139 Article 7(1) requires consideration of the CISG’s
“international character” and the “need to promote uniformity” in its

136. See Franco Ferrari, Uniform Application and Interest Rates Under the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 471 (1995).
137. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova D’Agostino, S.P.A., 144 F.3d
1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998).
138. See, e.g., Shrivbir S. Grewal, Risk of Loss in Goods Sold During Transit: A Comparative
Study of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the British Sale of Goods Act, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 93, 102
(1991) (stating that, generally, the question of who carries the burden of proof is to be determined by
the choice of law rules of the forum, not the Convention).
139. See id. at 95–106.
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application.140 This implies that the CISG’s legislative history, international
case law, and scholarship should inform courts and tribunals applying its
provisions.141 Unlike the common law, in which legislation traditionally is
strictly read,142 the CISG’s “international character” and “need to promote
uniformity” invites a more flexible, purposive approach.143
Most tribunals and commentators then rely on subdivision (2) of
Article 7, however, to distinguish between only two categories of hard
cases: cases involving questions about matters governed by the CISG but
not expressly settled by it (Category II matters) and cases falling outside of
the coverage of the CISG (Category III matters).144 All Category II
interpretive matters should be resolved uniformly and permanently; only
Category III matters may be decided in a non-uniform and case-by-case
matter. Thus, the goal of CISG autonomous interpretation, with respect to
all Category II matters, should be the crystallization, over time, of uniform
and definitive rules. This crystallization should occur, to be sure, at the
international level and without regard to domestic legal norms, but
ultimately, the goal should be a set of definitive interpretive outcomes that
all tribunals, the world around, can apply uniformly. As the next part of this
Article argues, however, while the two identified categories of hard cases
are important, they are not the only types of hard cases that tribunals
interpreting the CISG face. By starting with a narrow view about the goals
of interpretation and the possible types of interpretive challenges tribunals
face, tribunals and commentators have created unnecessary confusion as
they try to stuff all hard cases into one of two boxes.
III. A NEW TAXONOMY OF INTERPRETIVE CHALLENGES
Professor Philip Hackney wrote an article ten years ago entitled Is the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods Achieving
Uniformity?145 In the article, Professor Hackney provided an answer:

140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Michael Joachim Bonell, Article 7, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 65, 77–78 (Cessare Massimo Bianca & Michael Joachim
Bonell eds., 1987) (stating that in common law systems, statutes are interpreted “in a very strict sense”
and that general principles derived from case law are used for statutory gap-filling as opposed to the
civil law approach of deriving general principles from the legislation itself).
143. See Grewal, supra note 138, at 95–106; see also Kilian, supra note 45, at 228–29 (stating that
“[n]arrow interpretation . . . does not sit well with the international character of the Convention”).
144. See Grewal, supra note 138.
145. Philip Hackney, Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods
Achieving Uniformity?, 61 LA. L. REV. 473 (2001).
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maybe.146 Following Professor Hackney’s invitation, this article provides
another answer: it depends. I contend that if by “uniformity” one means
uniformity of interpretive outcomes, then the answer is an unequivocally
“no.” If, however, by “uniformity” one means uniformity of procedural or
methodological interpretation, then the answer may well be “yes.” After all,
most commentators and tribunals seem to agree that the proper method of
addressing CISG interpretive disputes is the autonomous method.147 I too
agree that the autonomous method should be used. I argue, however, in this
Part that the CISG was never intended to achieve the goal of uniformity of
interpretive outcomes in all hard CIG cases.
Significantly, my argument differs from similar sounding arguments
made by skeptics of the CISG or those proponents of the CISG that aim to
justify the Convention’s uneven application by maintaining, in essence, that
the CISG is better than nothing.148 Rather than maintaining either that the
CISG is failing because it has not, and likely cannot, promote uniformity of
interpretive outcomes or that the CISG remains a valiant, if ultimately
pyrrhic, effort to give the world a framework for promoting relatively
uniform interpretive outcomes, I contend that many of the CISG’s key
provisions invite, and may well require, that tribunals reach case-specific
and contingent interpretations that may differ across jurisdictions and
among contracts.
Accordingly, this Part begins by explaining why rational international
contracting parties might want open-standard terms to govern portions of
their relationships. Relying on the path-breaking work of Professors Robert
Scott and George Triantis in Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
this Part argues that all contracting parties design their deals by making
tradeoffs between investing in ex ante specification of contract rules or
postponing detailed specification of performance requirements by adopting
standards. By including an optimal mix of rules and standards, contracting
parties maximize their perceived joint welfare. Given that standards have
value precisely because they require ex post and individuated specification,
an important goal of the CISG—promoting freedom of contract and
corresponding gains from trade—could be eroded if, as many
commentators want, CISG standards were slowly hardened into more
precise rules.

146. See id. at 479–81.
147. See supra notes 108-117.
148. See, e.g., Johan Steyn, A Kind of Esperanto?, in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 14–15 (Peter
Birks, ed. 1994) (“No convention can eliminate uncertainties in its application. But a convention such
as the Vienna Sales Convention will tend to reduce differences and to eliminate uncertainty.”).
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This Part then offers a taxonomy of hard CISG cases that recognizes
the value of open-textured standards to contracting parties. More
specifically, this Part argues that three, rather than merely two, general
types of hard CISG cases exist. First, there are cases where a tribunal
determines that a matter is governed by the Convention but “not expressly
settled in it.” Second, there are cases where a tribunal determines that a
matter was governed by the Convention but has been altered by the parties
pursuant to Article 6. Finally, there are cases where a tribunal will
determine that a matter falls outside of the ambit of the Convention. The
real innovation of the proposed taxonomy, however, is in the recognition
that each of these types of hard cases includes one or more subtypes, two of
which need not be, and in fact should not be, interpreted with the goal of
achieving uniform outcomes.
A. The Value of Open-Textured Standards
Contrary to the standard view of CISG interpretation and of intra
legem gaps, in particular, not all vague CISG provisions are equal. Some
vague provisions may be considered open-textured standards intentionally
designed by the drafters to condition on criteria that must be established by
a tribunal ex post. For instance, vague provisions conditioning on terms
like “reasonableness” or “best efforts” may be viewed not as drafting errors
or unfortunate byproducts of concessions made during the CISG drafting
process, but instead as valuable contracting terms that allow parties to
allocate investments between the “front and back end of the contracting
process.”149
This section begins by describing the value that contracting parties can
gain from using a mix of standards and rules in their contracts and arguing
that CISG default standards may aid the parties in creating an optimal mix.
It then rebuts two interrelated arguments, at least in the context of the
CISG, that defaults in contract law should be comprised of rules rather than
standards. First, it rebuts the contention that CISG defaults are sticky and
that parties will, therefore, either be stuck with a standard when they would
prefer a rule or they will have to spend an inefficiently large amount of
effort to opt out of the default standard. Second, it rebuts the contention
that the default set should be comprised primarily of rules rather than
standards because standards fail to provide sufficient guidance to parties
about their performance obligations and expose parties to the risk of moral
hazard. Finally, this section concludes that the value parties can gain from
having the default set comprised of open-textured standards might be
149. See Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 55, at 818.
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eroded if CISG defaults framed as standards were slowly transformed into
rules through application of the autonomous method of interpretation.
1. Parties Can Gain Value by Including a Mix of Standards and Rules
in their Contracts
In Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, Professors Scott and
Triantis address a core puzzle: why do sophisticated contracting parties
regularly include and even negotiate over vague standards in their deals?150
The significance of this puzzle cannot be overstated. The theory of
incomplete contracting had led many commentators to conclude that parties
were so concerned about uncertainty and litigation costs that they would
avoid the use of vague standards like “best efforts” and “commercial
reasonableness” altogether.151 These commentators’ conclusions, however,
chaffed against commercial practice, creating a noticeable gap between
theory and reality. Contracting parties not only use vague terms like “best
efforts” in their agreements, they use them frequently. Professors Scott and
Triantis offered a solution to this puzzle, explaining that parties regularly
include a mix of precise and vague terms in their contracts because such a
mix allows them to calibrate the efficiency of their transaction.152
Contract terms may be precise, vague or anywhere in between. When
parties choose a relatively precise or specific rule, they are increasing their
ex ante investment.153 In other words, parties spend more money at the
front end of the contracting process contemplating future contingencies and
negotiating over terms specifying precise obligations in light of those
contingencies. By investing more at the front end of the process, parties are
hoping to leverage the information that they have about their shared
contracting goals and incentives to maximize gains from trade in order to
reduce ex post enforcement costs.154 On the other hand, when parties
choose a relatively open-textured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante
investment and increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs.155

150. See id. at 817 (observing that, despite the predictions of economic theory, parties regularly
negotiate over and include vague contract terms in their deals).
151. See id. Indeed, many commentators went further and argued that contract default rules should
be framed as rules rather than standards precisely because this is what most contracting parties would
want. For more on this point, see id. at 848–51.
152. Id. at 817.
153. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009).
154. Id. (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their
contractual ends and have the right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are
sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court might have”).
155. See id.
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Rather than spending time and money worrying about future contingencies
and terms specifying precise obligations in light of those contingencies at
the front end of the contracting process, parties are choosing to delegate to
a future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations. Such ex post or
back-end specification is efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis argue,
where the value to the parties of a decision maker’s hindsight outweighs
the value that the parties would gain by specifying ex ante a more precise
rule to govern their contract.156
In short, as Professors Scott and Triantis state, parties use rules and
standards to “maximize the incentive bang for the contracting buck.”157
By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs,
parties can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a
particular gain in contractual incentives. Conversely, for any given
expenditure of contracting costs, the parties can reach the highest possible
incentive gains by optimizing the allocation of their investment between
the front and back ends.158
Thus, both rules and standards are important tools in efficient contract
design. Both rules and standards, in other words, have value to contracting
parties.
Given that both rules and standards have value to contracting parties,
it is at least conceivable that an international sales law default set could be
comprised of primarily rules, primarily standards or some combination of
the two without necessarily having a negative impact on contract
efficiency. Ultimately, of course, the question of what terms the majority of
international contracting parties want in their sales contracts is an empirical
one that could be tested by observing how frequently parties opt out of the
Convention.159 Empirical evidence on this issue, however, is lacking.160 In

156. Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation, supra note 55, at 819 (“The parties choose between
front- and back-end proxy determination by comparing the informational advantage the parties may
have at the time of contracting against the hindsight advantage of determining proxies in later
litigation.”); id. at 842 (“The parties may view the court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage
depending on how much uncertainty has been resolved by the time contract performance is due.”).
157. Id. at 823.
158. Id. at 817.
159. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1349, 1361 (2009) (“Observation of contracting-around behavior can thus provide an empirical test of
the efficiency of a contractual default provision.”).
160. Others have also recognized this but suggested that the scant empirical evidence available
indicates that the CISG does not contain defaults that most contracting parties want. For instance,
Professors Scott and Gillette note that “[a] successful ‘substantively uniform’ [international sales law]
would result in only a minimal amount of opting out.” Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 477. They go
on to observe that, although hard empirical evidence is lacking, “our anecdotal evidence from
conversations with attorneys who deal in international sales is that a substantial amount of opting out
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the absence of such evidence, commentators have offered essentially two
overlapping arguments for the proposition that default standards are, in
general, less likely to be desirable to contracting parties than default rules.
First, commentators have argued that defaults, whatever their content,
become sticky, so that contracting parties have a trouble opting out of
them. Commentators then pair this stickiness problem with a second
contention: standards often fail to supply contracting parties with sufficient
ex ante guidance about their performance obligations and expose them to
the risk of moral hazard. In the following sections, I rebut both of these
arguments. I then conclude by suggesting that the potential value of the
CISG’s default standards would, in fact, be eroded if these standards were
slowly crystallized into rules through an application of the autonomous
method of interpretation.
a. The Problem of Sticky Defaults
Many contract defaults are sticky in the sense that parties who want to
opt out of them may have a hard time doing so. At least after Ronald
Coase’s revolutionary work, it seems clear that, if transaction costs are
sufficiently low, contractual defaults are really irrelevant because parties
can and will negotiate around suboptimal ones.161 “Parties should arrive at
the same contractual risk allocations, either explicitly (by contracting
around the defaults) or implicitly, (by choosing not to contract around the
defaults) regardless of the content of the default rules.”162 Of course,
transactions costs are not always low, as the default rule paradigm itself
recognizes. More significantly, however, considerations other than drafting
occurs.” Id. at 478; see also, e.g., Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISG – Successes and
Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 463 n.35 (2009) (discussing the few surveys that have been conducted
suggesting that in the United States, Germany and Switzerland, a majority of contracting parties,
particularly in commodities transactions, exercise their Article 6 rights to opt out of CISG coverage
entirely). This evidence seems unpersuasive even for the general proposition that many contracting
parties are opting out of the Convention. It seems even more unpersuasive for the proposition that the
reason that parties are opting out is that the Convention fails to provide the terms that most contracting
parties want. Indeed, even Professors Scott and Gillette concede that much of the sparse survey
evidence that exists on opting out focuses on commodities associations, but such associations have
complex self-regulatory regimes and thus stand to benefit little from any set of default rules. See
Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 478. The fact that such associations tend to opt out of the Convention,
then, says very little about the desirability of the Convention’s terms to other general parties not
protected by self-regulatory regimes. Moreover, other recent surveys show that after an initial rejection
of the CISG, business people seem more and more willing to accept the CISG. Bonell, supra note 9, at
5.
161. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The
Coase theorem predicts that contracting parties will bargain to the efficient allocation of rights and
responsibilities, without regard to initial entitlements so long as transaction costs are low. See, e.g.,
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 80–82 (2d ed. 1997).
162. Korobkin, supra note 72, at 621.
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costs might cause contracting parties to stick with an otherwise undesirable
default. Parties, that is, “might choose not to opt out of a legal default even
when a better provision can easily be identified and articulated at a
negligible drafting cost.”163
A number of scholars have explored at length this notion that default
rules, and contract default rules in particular, may be sticky.164 For
purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that three principle explanations
for the stickiness of defaults have been offered. First, stickiness may be
explained on behavioral economic grounds. More specifically, stickiness
may be due to the prevalence of the status quo bias.165 Individuals tend to
systematically favor maintaining a current state of affairs—the status quo—
rather than switching to some alternative state.166 Second, stickiness may
exist because proposing an opt out might send an undesirable signal to a
contracting partner.167 This is particularly true in situations where repeat
interactions are likely or necessary and thus where relational norms may
become as important or more important than legal norms in enforcing the
arrangement.168 Finally, defaults might be sticky because of network and
learning benefits that arise because multiple parties are using and reusing a
widely proliferated term.169 Essentially, when a term gets regularly used by
multiple parties, it may become a shorthand signifier of many complex
norms because it is now a familiar and commercially standard part of
transactions.

163. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 85, at 651 (emphasis in original).
164. See, e.g., id. at 651–52 (noting that the “stickiness” of defaults has been discussed in a number
of contexts); see generally Korobkin, supra note 72; Johnston, supra note 66; Lisa Bernstein, Social
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997). The descriptions that follow are based largely on the
taxonomy developed by Omri Ben-Shahar and John A.E. Pottow.
165. See generally Korobkin, supra note 72.
166. See id. at 625; see also, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation,
and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing
the status quo bias in contract negotiations).
167. See Bernstein, supra note 164, at 71–72; see also, e.g., Johnston, supra note 66, at 626–27
(arguing that some defaults are stickier than others because proposing an opt out would reveal
particularly sensitive information that might allow the contracting partner to expropriate a greater share
of the contractual surplus).
168. Bernstein, supra note 164, at 70; see also, e.g., Scott, supra note 59, at 1646 (“[W]here parties
contemplate repeated interactions, neither party will breach an agreement if the expected gains from
breaching are less than the expected returns from future transactions that breach would sacrifice.”);
Avner Greif, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 287, 287–95 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing how
cultural and social standing impact self-enforcement).
169. See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 164, at 718–23.
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Although all three explanations of stickiness may be persuasive, there
are sound reasons to believe that none of them applies (or they only apply
with substantially reduced force) to CISG defaults. With respect to the
status quo bias, there is little reason for parties using the CISG to feel a
strong attachment to the current state of affairs—the defaults. The altering
rule provided by Article 6 gives the parties virtually unfettered discretion to
opt in or out of the default set entirely and equally unfettered discretion to
vary or derogate from any particular default.170 Certainly, a distinction can
and should be drawn between the stickiness of an altering rule and the
underlying stickiness of the substantive default provisions, but when an
altering rule expressly authorizes opt outs with few (or in the case of the
CISG, essentially no) restrictions, it becomes less likely that any inherent
stickiness in the underlying defaults matters. This is so because no CISG
contracting party would have grounds to feel any strong entitlement to a
particular CISG default. The status quo, in other words, is weak and easily
alterable. It is reasonable to infer, then, that neither party would have a
strong basis for preferring the default over other possible contract terms.171
Similarly, although the concern about sending an undesirable signal
might obtain with respect to CISG defaults, the strength of any such signal
would be weak because the status quo is weak. The CISG regime selfconsciously places party autonomy and freedom at the center of its
priorities. The fact that one party might propose an alteration of the CISG
framework says little other than that the party is doing precisely what the
Convention anticipates that parties will do—tailor the Convention to their
particular transactional needs.
Finally, at least if my proposal that tribunals resist the temptation to
harden default standards into default rules is adopted, there would be few
network or learning benefits to be gained by sticking with the CISG
defaults. Instead, parties that choose to stick with the defaults would be
doing so precisely because they believe that inclusion of an open-textured
standard that does not have ex ante content and detail will be more efficient
than inclusion of a more specific and definite rule. Accordingly, sticking
with the defaults would mean only that the parties were asking courts to
engage in an ex post and case-by-case consideration of disputes, which
would provide little benefit to future parties using the same set of defaults.
Parties would therefore feel little compulsion to stick to the defaults—they

170. See discussion, supra, at notes 82-84.
171. Significantly, there is also little research to suggest that firms suffer from cognitive biases. To
the contrary, it is likely that firms tend to correct for cognitive biases, due to market pressures, even if
individuals in the firm suffer from them. See Schwartz & Scott, note 53, at 551.
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would do so only if the defaults were sensible in the context of their
particular transaction.
b. The Ex Ante Guidance and Potential Moral Hazard Problems with
Default Standards
Professors Gillette and Scott, in their seminal article on the political
economy of the CISG drafting process, have argued that “[t]he
promulgation of many vague default terms [in the CISG] is inconsistent
with the need to balance standards with rules.”172 According to them, it is
better policy for sales law to provide definite default rules and allow the
parties to contract around those defaults with vague standards when they so
choose. They, in other words, maintain that “[c]ourts and statutory
drafters . . . are wise to interpret the absence of vague standards in
particular cases as instructions to limit their construction to the specific
terms of the contract.”173
In their view, vague or open-textured default rules in international
sales law can adversely impact contracting costs in at least two ways:
First, contracting parties typically need specific guidance
regarding their performance obligations. For example, a
seller generally will want to know what quality level to
produce in order to satisfy a contractual obligation. Telling
that seller that its product must “at least satisfy the buyer’s
ordinary purposes” is not a very helpful guide to
satisfactory performance. . . .
[Second] [s]tandards can also increase the risk of moral
hazard and the evasion of contractual responsibilities. When
it is unclear what any party must do, contracting parties
have an incentive to interpret ambiguous circumstances in
their favor.174
These two arguments derive from nearly identical ones that Professor
Scott has made about default standards in domestic contract law.175
According to Professor Scott, “standards give rise to a variety of
undesirable effects and thus should be avoided [as defaults] as a matter of
contract policy.”176 These undesirable effects, as he makes clear in a
footnote, are the same impacts that he and Professor Gillette refer to in the
172. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 484.
173. Id. at 457.
174. Id. at 456–57.
175. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 601–05 (articulating the same two concerns
regarding standards as defaults in domestic contract law).
176. Scott & Triantis, Embedded Options, supra note 68, at 1478.
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context of standards as defaults in the CISG.177 Indeed, more recently,
Professor Scott has reaffirmed his skepticism of standards as defaults in
domestic law, arguing that “both theory and the available empirical
evidence suggest that commercial parties would prefer a regime in which
equitable override of formal contract doctrine is invoked only if
specifically requested at the time the parties form their agreement.”178
Although Professor Scott’s skepticism of standards as defaults in domestic
law is well founded, I maintain that it should not extend to the CISG.
With respect to the concern that standards as defaults fail to provide
sufficient guidance to contracting parties, Professor Scott has conceded that
“[p]arties that need specific guidance write detailed rules in their
contracts.”179 Thus, parties in need of specific guidance “commonly
ignore,” or opt out of, default standards articulated in domestic sales law
and draft their own terms.180 Unless the defaults are sticky, then, it is not
necessarily apparent why a default that fails to provide any particular
contracting parties with sufficient guidance should be problematic. And, as
discussed in the previous section, there are good reasons to believe that
CISG defaults are not sticky.
Professor Scott has also argued that if default standards provide little
guidance to most parties and most parties therefore opt out of the defaults
and draft their own more illuminating rules, lawmakers are simply wasting
resources when they create the defaults.181 While this argument makes good
sense in the context of United States domestic law (and potentially other
domestic law) where the lawmakers are frequently courts creating,
modifying or extending common law rules and thus constantly in the
process of lawmaking, it does not hold up as well in the context of the
CISG. As an initial matter, the bulk of the lawmaking process with respect
to the CISG is complete and thus most of the creation costs have already
been expended. These creation costs are, in essence, sunk costs that can be
ignored for purposes of deciding whether the now-existing legal regime
should be used.182

177. See id. at n.184.
178. Kraus & Scott, supra note 153, at 1028.
179. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602.
180. Id.
181. See id. (“The state wastes drafting resources when it creates a standard that parties routinely
reject.”); Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457–58.
182. See, e.g., EARL L. GRINOLS, MICROECONOMICS 241 (1994) (explaining that sunk costs are
“costs that cannot be altered or avoided by current or future decisions” and thus should not be
considered when weighing future choices).
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Moreover, as has already been discussed, little empirical evidence
exists demonstrating that parties are, in fact, “routinely” opting out of the
CISG defaults.183 Finally, even if they were, that fact alone would not
necessarily undermine the framework of the CISG as a whole. To the
contrary, the CISG’s robust commitment to freedom of contract—
authorizing parties to opt out of specific, undesirable default provisions—
may confer significant benefits on contracting parties when compared with
more restrictive domestic sales law regimes.
With respect to the concern that standards as defaults increase the risk
of moral hazard, Professors Gillette and Scott concede that contracting
parties themselves often choose to incorporate into their contracts vague,
open-texture terms requiring ex post specification.184 “To be sure,”
Professors Gillette and Scott point out, “commercial parties often include
broad standards of reasonableness or effort in their contracts.”185 Thus, they
recognize that open-textured standards can and often do have value to
parties. Professors Scott and Gillette suggest, however, that “[w]hen it is
unclear what any party must do, contracting parties have an incentive to
interpret ambiguous circumstances in their favor.”186 They offer, as an
example, a situation where the market price of a good dips below the
contract price.187 Under such circumstances, a buyer may have the
incentive to claim that it has a reasonable basis for refusing to pay the
contract price.188 If the price term, in this hypothetical situation, is
governed by a standard rather than a rule, then the buyer’s incentive to act
opportunistically will be increased. Standards, in short, exacerbate the risk
that one or both parties might act opportunistically. Standards only make
sense, then, under particular conditions that are best identified by the
parties themselves. Because of this serious concern, Professors Scott and
Gillette suggest that standards only be incorporated into a contract if the
parties expressly include them:
In any event, when these terms [standards] are useful, the
parties can always include them in their contract at
relatively low cost. Courts and statutory drafters, therefore,

183. As discussed previously, in footnote 160, there is some tentative evidence that parties opt out
of the CISG as a whole under Article 6. While such evidence could be more damning, if true, it is far
too threadbare to hold much weight.
184. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602–04 (arguing that default standards
exacerbate the risk of moral hazard).
187. See Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 457.
188. See id.
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are wise to interpret the absence of vague standards in
particular cases as instructions to limit their construction to
the specific terms of the contract.189
In this way, parties can precisely communicate their particular mix of
rules and standards to a tribunal, and thus ensure that a standard only
governs when “the party on whom it confers discretion is otherwise
motivated to take both parties’ interests equally into account.”
Again, this argument mirrors, almost precisely, the same argument
made by Professor Scott about domestic contract law.190 But, unlike
domestic law, the CISG diminishes the concern that default standards
might increase the risk of moral hazard. As discussed in the previous
section addressing the stickiness of defaults, unlike domestic defaults
where parties might not know what precise wording will operate to exclude
enforcement of a default, Article 6 of the CISG provides definitive
authorization for parties to derogate from or vary any particular provision
of the Convention. Thus parties can refer specifically to the relevant
Convention Article and provision from which they wish to derogate and
thereby delineate, with the clarity that Professors Scott and Gillette insist
parties need, their optimal mix of rules and standards to ensure that a
standard governs only when both parties’ interests are equally taken into
account.
2. The Value of Open Textured Standards to Parties Might be Eroded
if They Were Hardened into Rules
Open-textured standards, as the previous sections argue, can and often
do have value to contracting parties. Notably, even commentators
concerned with non-uniformity of interpretive outcomes under opentextured CISG provisions often come close to acknowledging that such
provisions have value. For instance, one commentator complaining, in one
breath, about the lack of uniform outcomes under the CISG, has, in another
breath, recognized that, because the CISG was intended to apply “across
the globe and in a wide variety of sale situations[,] . . . [i]t is vital that such
an ambitious and broad document is open-textured and gives enough room
to decision-makers to make it workable.”191 Whether these open-textured
standards are incorporated into the contract because the parties have
acquiesced to them as defaults or whether they are incorporated because the
parties have specifically drafted them into the contract, opting out of more
189. Id.
190. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 53, at 602–05.
191. Notably, Nicholas Whittington, Comment on Professor Schwenzer’s Paper, 36 VICT. U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 809, 809–10 (2005).
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definite rule-like defaults,192 they are an important part of efficient contract
design.
This conclusion compels another: tribunals interpreting open-textured
CISG provisions should not diminish the value that such provisions provide
to parties by attempting to render them, under the guise of interpretation,
more definite for future cases. Tribunals, in other words, should not try to
convert open-textured standards into definite rules.193 This is true even if
the parties have the ability to freely contract out of the newly-hardened
rules. It is no answer to contend that so long as the parties have such
freedom it should make little difference to them whether a tribunal slowly
adds definiteness to a formerly vague default rule because the parties can,
at whatever point they find it efficient to do so, revise the slowly evolving
rule-like default so that it is, once again, a vague standard requiring ex post
specification. This is no answer because it assumes that ascertaining the
current state of the evolution of the default is costless. Particularly in the
context of the CISG, obtaining, translating and then interpreting CISG
tribunal decisions from around the globe in order to determine the current
state of CISG defaults would be far from costless. And, as Professors
Gillette and Scott note, one of the key benefits to a uniform sales law is the
“reduc[tion of] the costs to particular parties of learning about the legal
consequences of any particular set of sales law rules.”
Specification, then, of sufficiently detailed standards to make sense of
such vague, open-textured provisions should take place on a case-by-case
basis. Tribunals need not look outside of the context of the specific parties’
agreement when specifying these standards nor should they develop factors
or rules that can be applied in future cases. Indeed, the point of a vague,
open-textured standard is to avoid such rigidity and allow tribunals to
address contingencies with the full benefit of hindsight.
Formally, tribunals faced with hard cases involving intentionally
vague provisions of the CISG should utilize Article 7(2) only insofar as it
directs tribunals to consider one of the fundamental principles underlying
the Convention: broad freedom of contract. This general principle, derived
from Article 6, which provides the parties with virtually unfettered
discretion to opt out of the Convention entirely or derogate from or vary its

192. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 6 (allowing the parties to exclude, derogate from or vary the
effect of any provisions subject only to the constraints in Article 12).
193. Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 458–59. This benefit only exists so long as the sales law
itself remains relatively constant. The gradual judicial hardening of intentionally soft default terms runs
counter to the requirement that sales law remain predictable.
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provisions,194 requires tribunals to adhere to the parties’ selection of
contract provisions, including the parties’ choice to acquiesce to opentextured defaults.
B. A Taxonomy of Hard CISG Cases Recognizing the Value of OpenTextured Standards
Having established the potential value of default standards to
contracting parties, I now turn to the introduction of a taxonomy of hard
CISG cases. This taxonomy recognizes the importance of default standards
while conceding that some CISG provisions may, in fact, be framed as
unclear rules in need of additional clarification by tribunals.
1. Matters Governed by but “Not Expressly Settled” in the CISG
As the standard view of Article 7(2) correctly recognizes, the first type
of hard case under the CISG involves matters that are governed by but not
expressly settled in the Convention.195 The standard view, however, treats
all gaps in this category the same, running them through what is
conventionally viewed as a two-tiered interpretive methodology in Article
7(2) in order to plug them permanently.196 This standard view fails to
recognize that there are two distinct subcategories of hard cases involving
matters governed by but not expressly settled in the CISG, each of which
needs to be analyzed differently.
a. Open-Textured Standards
Many of the CISG’s provisions are open-textured and allow
application of contextual inputs such as trade usage or custom or past
dealings between the parties. For example, the CISG does not precisely
define “fundamental breach,” a significant concept that impacts the
availability of remedies.197 The only explanation of the term, which appears
in Article 25, raises as many questions as it answers. It provides in
194. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 40, at 4 (“[T]he Convention . . . responds to the power of
agreement . . . . [It] does not interfere with the freedom of sellers and buyers to shape the terms of their
transactions.”).
195. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(2) (stating that general principles on which the CISG is based
should guide its interpretation and if these do not exist then private international law).
196. See supra Part II.
197. The CISG, supra note 3, distinguishes between a general and a fundamental breach. While a
general breach entitles the aggrieved party to claim damages, the party is only entitled to the remedies
of contract avoidance or the delivery of substitute goods if he can prove that the breach is fundamental.
With respect to buyer’s remedies, see Article 49(1)(a), Article 51(1) & (2) (avoidance), and Article
46(2) (substitute delivery). With respect to seller’s remedy, see Article 64(1)(a) (avoidance). With
respect to common remedies, see Article 72(1), Article 73(1) & (2) (avoidance in case of anticipatory
breach and installment contracts).
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pertinent part that “[a] breach of contract committed by one of the parties is
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as substantially
to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract.”198 No
express provision, however, explains what a detriment that substantially
deprives a party of what they were entitled to expect might be.
Another example of an open-textured provision in the CISG is Article
39 and 43’s reference to “a reasonable time.”199 Article 39 essentially deals
with warranties of quality. Article 43 essentially deals with warranties of
title. Both Articles provide, in pertinent part, that buyers cannot recover for
breaches of these warranties if they “not give notice to the seller specifying
the nature of the [lack of conformity or third party claim] within a
reasonable time.”200 The CISG does not, however, define what constitutes a
“reasonable time.”
Fundamental breach and reasonable time are not the only concepts
that are left vague in the CISG. Professor Van Alstine has shown that in no
fewer than thirty-one instances, the CISG “variously measures the parties’
conduct from the perspective of a ‘reasonable person,’ defines rights or
obligations with reference to what is ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable,’ [or]
requires certain actions or notices within a ‘reasonable’ time.”201
As the previous sections of this Article have argued, such opentextured standards may well provide value to contracting parties.
Accordingly, these standards should not be hardened into rules through an
accretion of CISG case law or decisional practice.
2. Unclear Rules
Although some vague provisions of the CISG are intended to serve as
open-textured default standards, not all vague provisions fall into this
category. Instead, some provisions of the CISG are vague or imprecise—
unclear—rules. The CISG contains some unclear or vague rules for the
reasons articulated by proponents of the more standard system of
classifying CISG interpretation challenges. In many instances, unclear rules
exist in the CISG because of compromises during the convention’s
drafting. 202 As one commentator has noted, “[i]t is clear from the

198. CISG, supra note 3, art. 25.
199. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 39, 43.
200. CISG, supra note 3, arts. 39(1), 43(1).
201. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 101, at 751–52 (citing, among others CISG arts. 34,
35(2)(b), 37, 48(1), 60(a), 75, 77, 79(1), 79(4), 85, 86(1), 86(2), 87, 88(2), 88(3)).
202. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 12, at 139.
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Convention’s drafting history that many of the vague and ambiguous terms
that ended up in the CISG were the result of deliberate compromise.”203
For instance, although Article 1(1) states that the CISG applies only to
“contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in
different states,”204 neither the term “sale” nor the term “goods” is defined
by the CISG, except for exclusions of particular transactions.205 Unlike
intentionally vague, open-textured default terms like “fundamental breach”
discussed in the previous section, unclear rules—like ambiguity about what
constitutes a good and thus triggers application of the CISG—must be
formally specified for purposes of the pending case and for future cases.
Distinguishing, at the margins, between the terms in the CISG that are
intentionally vague, and thus designed to be standards, and terms that are
unclear rules may prove, of course, challenging. But recognizing the
distinction is the first critical step. With respect to the former, as the
previous section argues, tribunals should not engage the two-tier
interpretive hierarchy of Article 7(2). Instead, they should heed the will of
the parties and specify standards only contextually and provisionally. With
respect to the latter, however, Article 7(2) sets out the interpretive approach
that tribunals must take. In line with the conventional approach to CISG
interpretation, tribunals, in this situation, should first look to the general
principles of the CISG, interpreting the provision at issue autonomously to
provide a fixed and durable rule. Only if the general principles, as viewed
autonomously, do not provide an answer should a tribunal, under Article
7(2), turn to the domestic law applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law for assistance. In any event, however, tribunals, faced
with imprecise or unclear rules, have an obligation to disambiguate those
rules because contracting default rules are public goods (and in the context
of the CISG, internationally shared public goods).206
C. Derogation or Variation of CISG Provisions by the Parties
The standard classification of hard CISG cases fails to account for a
significant category of hard cases, those created by gaps formed when the
parties exercise their freedom under Article 6 to derogate from or vary
provisions of the CISG. As previously discussed, there are, in fact, few

203. Id. at 140.
204. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
205. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 2 (excluding certain transactions from the scope of “sale”), art. 3
(excluding certain transactions in which the buyer supplies materials for goods or in which the “seller”
primarily provides labor or services).
206. Goetz & Scott, supra note 49, at 276, 278; see also, e.g., Gillette & Scott, supra note 6, at 447
(observing that “[s]ales law default rules thus are public goods” and citing Goetz & Scott).
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limitations on this broad freedom of contract,207 so tribunals must account
for the probability that parties may take advantage of this freedom in ways
that can create two different types of hard cases.
1. Vague Standards
Sometimes, the parties may derogate from or vary the provisions in
the CISG in ways that generate vague standards. For instance, parties might
take an otherwise definite default rule, like Article 38(2)’s allowance that
“examination [of goods] may be deferred until after the goods have arrived
at their destination” if the contract provides for the carriage of the goods,208
and eliminate it altogether. In the instance of Article 38, this would leave
subdivision (1) intact, which provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he buyer
must examine the goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a
period as is practicable in the circumstances.”209 The result would be that
the parties would have replaced a definite rule—the buyer could wait at
least until the goods were transported to examine them. With an opentextured default, the buyer must examine the goods within a reasonable
time, which under the particular circumstances could conceivably precede
their carriage.
As discussed previously in section A(1), open-textured standards play
a valuable role in contract law. Tribunals should not minimize or
undermine the value gained by parties from incorporating vague standards
into their contracts by attempting to transform those standards into fixed
rules. This conclusion is warranted both when the parties simply opt into an
open-textured default, as previously discussed, and certainly when the
parties exercise their freedom under Article 6 to alter or derogate from an
otherwise applicable CISG provision.
2. Creation of Unclear Rules
In some instances, parties may derogate from or vary provisions of the
CISG under Article 6 in ways that unwittingly create unclear rules. For
instance, the parties might decide to derogate from Article 33 altogether.
Article 33 specifies three options for when a seller is obligated to deliver

207. The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of Article 12, which essentially states that
some member states may have made a declaration under Article 96 effectively requiring parties, in
those member states or doing business in those member states, to evidence their contracts,
modifications, or terminations with a writing. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 12. And, although the
Convention does not expressly mention it, there are likely a few other provisions that the parties cannot
derogate from—for example, public international law provisions contained in Articles 89-101. See
Ferrari, supra note 76, at 19.
208. CISG, supra note 3, art. 38(2).
209. CISG, supra note 3, art. 38(1).
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goods to the buyer.210 First, the seller must deliver the goods on or by any
date “fixed by or determinable from the contract.”211 If no such date can be
ascertained, then the seller must deliver the goods within a reasonable
time.212 Without Article 33, the seller’s obligation under Article 31, to
deliver the goods at issue, is rendered unworkably vague. By eliminating
Article 33, the parties, in this hypothetical, would have generated not an
open-textured standard but an unclear or imprecise obligation.
When faced with situations where parties have exercised their freedom
under Article 6 to create, presumably unwittingly, an unclear or imprecise
obligation rather than an open-textured standard, tribunals should use the
conventionally understood precepts of Article 7(2) to disambiguate the
situation. In this respect, tribunals should address party-created unclear
rules in the same manner as they address unclear rules existing independent
of the parties’ actions.
D. Matters Falling Outside of the Scope of the CISG
Article 4 establishes the essential scope of the CISG, stating that
“[t]his Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and
the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a
contract.”213 Article 4 goes on to point out that the Convention is not
concerned with “the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of
any usage” or “the effect which the contract may have on the property in
the goods sold.”214 Thus, as previously discussed, the CISG does not
address unconscionability, capacity defenses, fraudulent inducement or the
rights of a bona fide purchaser to goods that turn out to have been stolen.215
It also carves out consumer transactions216 or mixed contracts for the sale
of goods and services where the services are the “preponderant part of the
obligations of the party who furnishes the goods.”217 Similarly, it does not
apply to the sale of certain kinds of property, such as stocks, shares,
investment securities, money, electricity or ships, vessels or aircraft.218 The

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

CISG, supra note 3, art. 33.
CISG, supra note 3, arts. 33(a)-(b).
CISG, supra note 3, art. 33(c).
CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
CISG, supra note 3, arts. 4(a)-(b).
See supra note 76.
CISG, supra note 3, art. 2(a).
CISG, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 2(b)–(f).
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Convention “does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person.”219
Ultimately then, it is clear that “the CISG does not govern all the legal
questions which may arise in connection with an international sales
transaction.”220 Nevertheless, the precise delineation of matters falling
within the scope of the CISG (whether or not they are expressly settled in
it)221 or outside of the CISG’s coverage is difficult at best. As one
commentator has pointed out:
The phrase “governs only” (formation, rights, and obligations) is too
narrow and should be read as “governs without doubt,” for the Convention
also governs interpretation of statements, conduct, and contracts (Article
8), the applicability of usage and customs (Article 9), (freedom of) form
(Article 11 . . .), termination or modification of contracts by agreement
(Article 29(1)), [as well as] interpretation of the Convention and gap
filling . . . .222
Because the boundaries of the CISG are challenging to chart, hard
cases may arise when tribunals are faced with matters that might or might
not fall within the ambit of the Convention.223
CONCLUSION
CISG was formally uniform at the time of its adoption—it used the
same words in all of the jurisdictions adopting it.224 But uniform words are
not enough to guarantee uniform application. Indeed, to date, courts and
commentators have reached divergent interpretive positions with respect to
many of the CISG’s provisions. In the view of many commentators this
situation poses a dire threat to the continued validity or efficacy of the
Convention. Without greater uniformity of results, these commentators

219. CISG, supra note 3, art. 5.
220. Schlechthiem, supra note 44, at 64.
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. Schlechtriem, supra note 44, at 64.
223. Certainly, courts may also be faced with easy cases where one of the Convention’s express
carve outs applies. In such cases, courts need only abide by Judge Easterbrook’s simple and universal
rule—apply the carve out. See Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 61.
224. More precisely, the CISG was co-drafted, simultaneously, in six languages. See Steven Walt,
Novelty and the Risks of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 671, 676 (1999). This fact has caused
some commentators to fear that inaccuracies and discrepancies might exist between the “official” texts
of the CISG, not to mention between the “unofficial” texts produced in other languages, thus increasing
the risks of inconsistent interpretive results. See, e.g., Rose Kennedy, Much Ado About Noting:
Problems in the Legal Translation Industry, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 423, 431 (2000) (“The lack of
a controlling version among the CISG language versions is especially problematic, as some sections of
some translations differ and thus would bring about inconsistent results.”).
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argue, the CISG will, over time, fail to supply standard solutions to similar
contracting problems and thus fail to supply the sort of predictability on
which the Convention was premised.
I have argued, however, that these commentators start with an
exaggerated expectation about the kind and degree of uniformity called for
by the CISG. The conventional view about CISG interpretation, I contend,
rests on a binary reading of Article 7(2) coupled with an insistence on
autonomous interpretation in virtually all CISG hard cases. In so doing, it
oversimplifies the classification of hard CISG cases and thus overlooks at
least two significant categories of cases for which uniformity of outcomes
is not an appropriate goal—situations in which a CISG default provision
was cast by the drafters of the Convention as an open-textured standard and
situations in which the parties have modified a CISG rule to make it an
open-textured standard.
To rectify the shortcomings of the conventional view of CISG
interpretation, I have proposed a more nuanced taxonomy of hard CISG
cases. The real innovation of this proposed taxonomy is its recognition that
the methodological uniformity called for in Article 7, combined with a
proper regard for the structure of the Convention and its robust emphasis
on freedom of contract, compels the conclusion that case-by-case
differences in the interpretations of some provisions of the CISG are not
only inevitable but may be necessary. Accordingly, this proposed
taxonomy respects Article 7’s mandate of uniformity of interpretive
methodology while more accurately reflecting the substantive design of the
Convention. It also helps, I suggest, to recalibrate expectations about
uniformity, thereby establishing a framework for future work that can
evaluate whether or not the remaining non-uniformity in CISG outcomes is
significant enough to undermine the CISG as a whole.
In short, I believe that the CISG represents a remarkable achievement
in the harmonization of international sales. While uniformity of outcomes
in all hard CISG cases is, I believe, a quixotic goal, uniformity in the
interpretive methodology of the CISG is not. The continued validity and
efficacy of the Convention should not be impugned merely because
tribunals respect the contractual wishes of the parties and render case-bycase decisions based on the particularized circumstances facing parties.
These sorts of decisions are not only to be expected, but they are proper,
given the open-textured nature of many of the Convention’s default rules.
So long as tribunals use a uniform method of ex post specification of these
open-textured standards, I believe that there is hope that the Convention
can continue to offer contracting parties a valuable framework for
international sales.
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